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Understanding children’s perceptions of social inequalities is essential, as 
attitudes established in childhood can continue into adulthood, sustaining a damaging 
cycle of exclusion. This study examined 8-14 year-olds’ perceptions of economic 
disparities in access to opportunities, decisions about whether to correct or perpetuate 
these inequalities, and expectations for whether others would do the same. In order to 
place these issues in a familiar context, participants (N = 342) decided whom to admit to 
an educational summer camp opportunity when access had been restricted in the past 
based on economic status. Three central findings emerged.  
First, in contrast to pervasive assumptions about wealth and merit, children who 
were aware of economic inequalities were more likely to choose low-wealth peers when 
they had the chance to decide whom to admit to a special opportunity. Building on the 
theoretical foundation of the social reasoning development model (Killen, Elenbaas, & 
Rutland, 2015), these findings provide evidence for how awareness of intergroup 
 
 
relations can contribute to moral judgments in childhood. However, children interpreted 
inequality through the lens of their own economic background, exhibiting more concern 
for peers who were more economically similar to them. These socioeconomic differences 
have implications for peer relations in childhood and adolescence, and may have 
implications for social stratification later in life. 
Second, in contrast to their own decisions, between childhood and adolescence 
children increasingly expected others to seek access to opportunities for themselves. 
Further, children from higher-income families expected more self-serving tendencies than 
children from lower-income families. There are likely several mechanisms underlying 
higher-income children’s perceptions, potentially including exposure to competitive 
stereotypes from peers. 
Third, children held stereotypes about economic groups, and were increasingly 
likely to reference these stereotypes between childhood and adolescence. Stereotypes 
about the wealthy were similar to those observed in adults (e.g., competitive, entitled, 
selfish). Surprisingly, stereotypes about low-wealth peers were benevolent (e.g., kind, 
grateful, generous). However, “positive” stereotypes like these can be used to rationalize 
existing inequalities. These results have broader implications for educators and policy-
makers interested in designing programs that encourage consideration of economic 
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Chapter 1: Study Rationale, Aims, and Impact 
Children’s decisions about how to distribute, share, and exchange resources are 
considered a central context for investigating moral development (Damon, 1975; Piaget, 
1932; Turiel, 1983). Recent studies have documented the origins of many moral concepts 
(e.g., equality, merit, need) when children distribute resources like toys and snacks (see 
Killen, Elenbaas, Rizzo, & Rutland, 2016). Important moral issues also arise, however, 
with regard to the distribution of intangible, but valuable, opportunities.  
Disparities in access to opportunities, like educational opportunities, are pervasive 
(Duncan & Murnane, 2011), raising moral concerns for fairness among children and 
adults (Wainryb, Smetana, & Turiel, 2008). In fact, some research indicates that children 
reason about the denial of opportunities in terms of discrimination and rights (e.g., 
Brown, 2006; Helwig & Jasiobedzka, 2001), reflecting consideration of the long-term 
impact of restricting access.  
Decisions about access to opportunities often occur in intergroup contexts where 
stereotypes and prejudice can influence decision-making. Negative attitudes towards 
excluded groups can persist into adulthood and translate into discrimination (Abrams & 
Killen, 2014; Lott, 2012). Thus, understanding whether children perceive inequalities in 
access to opportunities as justified is a crucial step towards reducing biases in 
development. Extending research on resource allocation in intergroup contexts, this study 
investigated children’s perceptions, judgments, and expectations regarding everyday 
economic inequalities in access to educational opportunities. 
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Allocation of Resources 
Resource allocation decisions can be multifaceted, involving moral concerns for 
fairness as well as social concerns about group expectations. The majority of research in 
this area has focused on early childhood, investigating the emergence of moral concerns 
for equality, merit, and need between 3 and 8 years of age when children allocate 
resources (e.g., Paulus, 2014; Rizzo, Elenbaas, Cooley, & Killen, 2016; Schmidt, 
Svetlova, Johe, & Tomasello, 2016). The majority of research on children’s consideration 
of social group factors when allocating resources has also focused on early childhood, 
demonstrating young children’s ingroup bias when allocating more resources to racial, 
gender, and minimal ingroup members than to outgroup members (e.g., Benozio & 
Diesendruck, 2015; Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011; Renno & Shutts, 2015). 
Resource type and allocation norms. Recently, research in this area has 
expanded to include more nuanced investigations of children’s capacity to take into 
consideration factors like the type of resource being allocated (e.g., Chernyak & Sobel, 
2016) and pre-existing norms regarding resource allocation (e.g., Olson, Dweck, Spelke, 
& Banaji, 2011) when making distribution decisions. For example, by 6-8 years of age 
children distinguish between resources like candy and toys versus resources that are 
necessary to ensure others’ wellbeing when making allocation decisions (Rizzo et al., 
2016). Likewise recent work has demonstrated how, moving beyond the investigation of 
ingroup bias in, older children use their social knowledge about group membership and 
allocation norms in society to rectify inequalities for disadvantaged groups (Elenbaas & 
Killen, 2016b; Hughes & Bigler, 2011). Further, some recent work has begun to examine 
how children’s perceptions of the allocation norms that groups hold differ as a factor of 
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group status (e.g., whether the group is well-resourced or under-resourced) (Elenbaas & 
Killen, 2016c; Mulvey, Hitti, Rutland, Abrams, & Killen, 2014). 
Building on these recent advances, the current study investigated children’s 
decisions regarding the distribution of opportunities that entailed moral concerns for 
recipients’ welfare as well as social concerns regarding allocation norms in society. The 
social reasoning developmental (SRD) model guided this study (Killen, Elenbaas, et al., 
2015; Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010). This model draws on social domain theory for 
identifying when children consider moral, societal, and personal concerns when making 
judgments and decisions about the allocation of resources, as well as developmental 
subjective group dynamics theory for identifying how children perceive and respond to 
group allocation norms. A central aim of the current study was to examine how 
awareness of economic inequality contributes to children’s judgments about how 
opportunities should be allocated and perceptions of the allocation norms that advantaged 
and disadvantaged groups hold. 
Allocation of Opportunities 
Inequality of opportunity based on group membership constitutes a real and 
pressing social and moral concern (Duncan & Murnane, 2011). Interestingly, while most 
research on resource allocation has focused on early childhood, most research on 
developing knowledge about inequality of opportunity has focused on adolescence, 
examining, for example, conceptions of fair government and freedoms (Helwig, Ruck, & 
Peterson-Badali, 2014), political and social involvement (Diemer, Rapa, Voight, & 
McWhirter, 2016), explanations for economic inequality (Flanagan et al., 2014), and 
perceptions of how wealth is distributed (Arsenio, Preziosi, Silberstein, & Hamburger, 
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2013). Less is known regarding children’s awareness of broader inequalities in access to 
opportunities. 
However, between early and middle childhood, children are increasingly able to 
make connections between resource inequality and broader disparities in society (e.g., 
Elenbaas & Killen, 2016a). Likewise, older children and adolescents recognize that 
access to opportunities is constrained by individuals’ economic status (e.g., Goodman et 
al., 2000; Mistry, Brown, White, Chow, & Gillen-O’Neel, 2015; White, 2009). Building 
on these recent contributions, the current study bridged related work in childhood and 
adolescence in order to examine judgments, reasoning, and expectations regarding the 
allocation of familiar educational opportunities in a context of inequality based on 
economic status. 
Decisions about how to fairly allocate educational opportunities, in particular, 
have serious implications for recipients’ future wellbeing. In fact, related research on 
children’s judgments about the denial of educational opportunities has revealed that such 
situations invoke children’s and adolescents’ concerns for discrimination and rights 
(Brown, 2006; Helwig & Jasiobedzka, 2001; Horn, 2003; Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, 
& Stangor, 2002). However, judging the denial of educational opportunities to be wrong 
is different from actively allocating access to an opportunity in a context of previous 
inequality. The former issue entails a negative evaluation of a situation in which needs 
are not met, whereas the latter issue requires children to weigh fairness and group 
concerns to determine the best course of action. How children weigh these issues and 
make these decisions was the central focus of this study. 
5 
 
The Current Study 
This study examined children’s judgments, reasoning, and expectations regarding 
the allocation of educational opportunities (i.e., attendance at an educational summer 
camp) in a context of inequality based on economic status. This is a previously 
unexplored, but highly salient, fairness issue in children’s everyday lives. Extending 
research investigating children’s judgments about the denial of educational opportunities 
(e.g., Brown, 2006; Elenbaas, Rizzo, Cooley, & Killen, 2016), this study examined how 
children reason that such opportunities should be allocated. 
Recent research from the SRD perspective has revealed that, between early and 
middle childhood, children integrate their knowledge about race and resource inequality 
in society with their moral judgments about inequality to rectify disparities for 
disadvantaged groups (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016b, 2017). Building on this foundation, the 
current study examined whether children’s perceptions of economic inequalities in access 
to opportunities were related to their decisions about fair access to educational 
opportunities for high- and low-wealth peers. 
Further, while previous research has shown that older children and adolescents 
define group membership in terms of shared norms (Abrams & Rutland, 2008), less is 
known about children’s expectations regarding the exact norms that groups may hold, or 
whether these differ by group status (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016c). This study examined 
children’s expectations for others’ allocation preferences. Children’s recognition that 
others perspectives differ from their own when it comes to the allocation of opportunities 
has the potential to reveal important information regarding developing knowledge about 
how opportunities move through social systems (Arsenio, 2015). 
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Understanding children’s reasoning regarding these issues, and how they change 
between middle childhood and early adolescence, provides important information about 
moral development as it pertains to economic exclusion and fair access. Further, 
determining whether children and adolescents view inequality of opportunity as worthy 
of rectifying provides important information for researchers, practitioners, and 
policymakers alike.  
In short, the proposed study examined: (1) how children and adolescents allocate 
opportunities in a context of inequality based on economic status; (2) children’s 
expectations for how high-wealth and low-wealth groups would allocate opportunities in 
the same context; and (3) the role of recipient group and participant economic status on 
children’s judgments, decisions, and reasoning. Each of these foci represents one of the 
three specific aims of this study, which are outlined in greater detail in below. First, the 
next section will introduce the theoretical rational for the current study, in order to situate 
this work within the existing literature on moral development and intergroup relations in 
childhood and adolescence. 
Theoretical Overview: Social Reasoning Developmental Model 
As mentioned above, this study drew on Killen and Rutland’s social reasoning 
developmental (SRD) model (Killen, Elenbaas, et al., 2015; Rutland et al., 2010) to frame 
the design and hypotheses. The SRD model integrates the social domain theory 
perspective on moral development (Smetana, Jambon, & Ball, 2014; Turiel, 2006) with 
developmental social identity theories (Nesdale, 2004; Verkuyten, 2007) and theories of 
group dynamics in childhood (Abrams & Rutland, 2008). This model proposes that, when 
children make decisions in social contexts, they reason about multiple moral and social 
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group considerations, weighing their moral concerns for fairness with their developing 
knowledge about how groups function. More information on the component theories of 
the SRD model is provided in Chapter 2: Literature Review. 
SRD model and inequality. The SRD model’s dual focus on moral (e.g., 
fairness) and group dynamics (e.g., norms and expectations) concerns is especially 
applicable for this study on children’s and adolescents’ perspectives on economic 
exclusion and access to opportunities. Notably, most research on intergroup relations in 
development focuses on the negative aspects of intergroup attitudes (e.g., stereotypes, 
biases, conformity, or discrimination). However, when a group has been excluded from 
access to an opportunity, as in the current study, taking group membership into account is 
necessary for ensuring fair access in the future.  
A key, unique, prediction of the SRD model is that knowledge about intergroup 
relations (in this case, knowledge about economic inequalities in access to opportunities) 
can contribute to, rather than impede, the promotion of fairness (Elenbaas & Killen, 
2016b, 2017). That is, children’s increasing understanding of group processes, combined 
with increasingly sophisticated moral judgments, can actually help them to counter –
rather than replicate– unfair allocation norms. 
The next three sections provide a review of recent research, leading up to the three 
novel aims of the current study. Each segment provides an overview of key findings in 
pertinent areas, and frames the research questions of the current study in terms of the 
literature to date. 
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Children’s Judgments about Access to Opportunities 
Determining how to allocate access to educational opportunities entails 
consideration of the implications of inequality for recipients’ wellbeing. In fact, related 
research on children’s judgments regarding the denial of educational opportunity 
indicates that, when groups have been explicitly denied access, children and adolescents 
reason about broader issues of discrimination, restriction of development, and rights. 
Implications of inequality. For instance, children and adolescents judge it wrong 
for authority figures to deny educational opportunities (e.g., participation in a science 
fair) on the basis of social group membership (e.g., ethnicity, gender) and reason about 
fairness, rights, and the wrongfulness of discrimination (Brown, 2006; Helwig & 
Jasiobedzka, 2001; Horn, 2003; Killen et al., 2002). Interestingly, one recent study 
drawing on the SRD model found that 10-11 year-olds who attributed an observed 
inequality of resources between peers of different racial backgrounds to preferential 
treatment judged the inequality more negatively than children attributed it to other 
causes, revealing a link between awareness of discrimination and rejection of social 
inequalities (Elenbaas & Killen, 2017). 
Thus, unequal access to educational opportunities based on group membership is 
a salient issue invoking concerns for fairness among children and adolescents. Further, 
related work on children’s conceptions of nurturance rights also indicates that by age 9-
11 years, children support their own and others’ rights to quality education (Peterson-
Badali, Morine, Ruck, & Slonim, 2004), and between 8 and 16 years, children 
increasingly reference education as a right that children have (Ruck, Keating, 
Abramovitch, & Koegl, 1998). 
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Support for correcting inequality. Less is known, however, about whether 
children or adolescents support rectifying inequalities in access to educational 
opportunities. As previously mentioned, judging the denial of educational opportunities 
to be wrong is different from actively allocating access in a context of previous 
inequality. How children allocate opportunities, and whether they take into account past 
disparities, was a central focus of this study.  
The results of a small number of recent investigations provide evidence for the 
possibility that, in this context, children may support access for those who have been 
excluded in the past. As one example, in a recent study drawing on the SRD model to 
examine children’s allocation of hospital supplies (e.g., bandages, thermometers), 
Elenbaas and colleagues (2016b) found evidence for the joint roles of moral judgment 
and knowledge about intergroup relations in children’s resource allocation decisions. 10-
11 year-olds’ awareness of broader associations between race and wealth predicted their 
support for rectifying a resource inequality between racial groups. Similarly, Hughes and 
Bigler (2011) investigated 14-17 year-olds’ perceptions of a proposed program that 
would provide interested graduating African-American and Latino students with free in-
school assistance in completing college applications. Support for the program was greater 
among adolescents who perceived higher levels of racial disparities in society and 
attributed those disparities to racism. Further, recent research has emphasized that it is 
awareness of social inequality in particular (not support for equality in general) that 
motivates adolescents’ and young adults’ decisions to engage in political action on behalf 
of marginalized groups (e.g., protest, joining a political party, writing to a representative) 
(Diemer & Rapa, 2016). 
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Together, these findings underscore the combined roles of moral reasoning and 
awareness of inequality in predicting children’s and adolescents’ support for corrective 
allocation, in line with the parameters of the SRD model (Killen, Elenbaas, et al., 2015). 
Children must be aware of inequalities and evaluate them as wrong in order to respond 
with corrective action. Awareness of discrimination is an important first step, but 
awareness alone is not enough. Moral judgments and reasoning support children’s 
capacity to critique disparities and determine fair ways of distributing resources and 
opportunities when they have the chance to do so. 
Drawing on this recent work, the current study will determine whether, and in 
what ways, children take a past history of unequal access on the basis of economic status 
into account when allocating new opportunities, and whether they expect others to do the 
same, revealing important information about their social and moral development and 
conceptions of fair access. 
Children’s Perceptions of Group Distribution Norms 
While children themselves may support fair access to opportunities, they may, at 
the same time, expect others to adhere to unfair allocation norms, perhaps particularly if 
those norms benefit their group. In fact, by middle childhood, children recognize that 
groups are bound by norms and expectations (Abrams & Rutland, 2008), and may not 
have the same perspective on inequality as they do. Understanding children’s 
expectations for how others would allocate opportunities provides information about 
developing conceptions of how opportunities move through social systems (Arsenio et 
al., 2013; Wainryb & Recchia, 2014).  
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Older children and adolescents define group identity in terms of a set of shared 
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors (Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, & Marques, 2003; Abrams, 
Rutland, Pelletier, & Ferrell, 2009), and expect individuals to endorse these shared norms 
in order to maintain their group membership (Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2008; 
Mulvey & Killen, 2015). Children’s developing understanding that social groups may 
hold a different perspective from their own personal view is related to their increasing 
social experience with an ever-widening range of social groups and increasing capacity 
for social perspective taking (Abrams et al., 2009; Abrams, Van de Vyver, Pelletier, & 
Cameron, 2015; FitzRoy & Rutland, 2010; Jugert, Noack, & Rutland, 2011; Nesdale, 
2013). Older children recognize, for example, that given the choice, groups often 
advocate for more resources for their group while children themselves would prefer 
equality (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Mulvey et al., 2014). Yet less is known about the 
allocation norms that children expect groups to adhere to in the first place. 
While some studies indicate that children expect groups to seek more resources 
for themselves (DeJesus, Rhodes, & Kinzler, 2014; Paulus & Moore, 2014), other studies 
suggest that, in a context of inequality between groups, children’s expectations for others’ 
allocation decisions hinge on their expectations for how others would judge the inequality 
(Elenbaas & Killen, 2016c). Building on this recent work, the current study investigated 
children’s expectations for how groups would allocate educational opportunities in a 
context of inequality based on economic status, and whether these assumptions about the 
norms that groups hold vary by group wealth. These measures examined children’s 
developing knowledge of intergroup dynamics, how inequalities between groups are 
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exacerbated, and who might be expected to reinforce an unequal status quo versus rectify 
a disparity. 
 Economic Status and Distribution of Opportunities 
Notably, the research described above has mainly focused on children’s responses 
to the exclusion of racial or gender groups from access to educational opportunities. Less 
is known regarding children’s conceptions of fair access when groups differ in economic 
status. Economic disparities are a primary form of inequality. That is, while economic 
inequalities in access to opportunities, including educational opportunities, often map on 
to other group categories like race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, (dis)ability, 
religion, and immigrant status, economic inequalities are a form that underlies or 
reinforces inequality in most other group-based domains (Carter & Reardon, 2014; 
Saegert et al., 2007). Thus, they are of great importance when considering how 
opportunities are, and should be, distributed, and they constituted the intergroup focus for 
the current study. 
Like other intergroup contexts, allocation to individuals or groups that vary in 
wealth may invoke intergroup biases for children (i.e., preferential allocation to the 
ingroup), but it is very likely that this context would also invoke strong moral concerns 
for others’ welfare and needs (e.g., Ongley, Nola, & Malti, 2014; Shutts, Brey, 
Dornbusch, Slywotzky, & Olson, 2016) as well as strong assumptions about entitlement 
(e.g., Sigelman, 2012; Woods, Kurtz-Costes, & Rowley, 2005) that are less readily 
assessed in other intergroup contexts. Awareness of the relation between economic status 
and access to educational opportunities is also a part of children’s everyday lives. 
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Recognizing associations between economic status and opportunities. 
Economic status is a salient and relevant social consideration in children’s everyday lives 
and peer interactions. From as early as the preschool years, children have a basic 
awareness that higher wealth is associated with possession of more or better resources 
(Enesco & Navarro, 2003; Ramsey, 1991; Shutts et al., 2016). In late childhood and early 
adolescence, children also begin to recognize the connection between economic status 
and access to opportunities. By 8-10 years of age, for instance, children note that some 
peers participate in after-school clubs or travel to summer camps or vacation destinations 
while others do not, and that this varies by family wealth and income (Mistry et al., 2015; 
White, 2009). 
Older children and adolescents are able to identify their own families’ economic 
status relative to other families in their neighborhood or school (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, 
& Ickovics, 2000; Goodman, Maxwell, Malspeis, & Adler, 2015; Mistry et al., 2015), 
and both high-SES and low-SES adolescents report having more same-SES than cross-
SES friends (Crosnoe & Schneider, 2010; Grewal, 2013; Weinger, 2000). Further, 
approximately one in five adolescents has been teased (by peers) about their family’s 
financial situation (Bucchianeri, Eisenberg, & Neumark-Sztainer, 2013). 
In addition to increased attention to economic status in social life, older 
adolescents demonstrate greater awareness of the role of education (the opportunity 
represented in the current study) in determining wealth and income in adulthood (Arsenio 
et al., 2013; Flanagan et al., 2014; Goodman et al., 2000). Together, these findings point 
to the relevance of economic status in children’s and adolescents’ everyday lives, and 
suggest that late childhood and early adolescence is a time when awareness of the links 
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between economic status and access to education increases. Accordingly, the age range of 
8-14 years was chosen for the current study in order to capture changes in children’s 
judgments, reasoning, and expectations regarding the allocation of educational 
opportunities during a time in development when inequality in this context becomes 
increasingly salient for children. 
Does awareness support correcting or perpetuating? Children’s increasing 
awareness of the links between economic status and access to opportunities may have a 
positive or a negative impact on their decisions about how to provide opportunities for 
high- and low-wealth peers.  
Potential negative impact. One possibility is that children may infer that 
inequality of opportunity based on economic status is justified, and determine that groups 
who have received more access in the past remain entitled to their advantaged position. 
Supporting this possibility, adults often rationalize or legitimize existing social 
arrangements, fulfilling a psychological need to understand the status quo as good, fair, 
natural, desirable, and inevitable (Jost & Banaji, 1994), and find ways of justifying and 
maintaining status quo economic disparities between groups (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 
2004; Kay & Jost, 2003). Some research suggests that children, too, perceive some 
group-based resource inequalities to be deserved, and assume that the way things are is 
the way that that they are supposed to be (Horwitz, Shutts, & Olson, 2014; 
McGillicuddy-De Lisi, Daly, & Neal, 2006; Olson et al., 2011). 
Further, adults often hold stereotypes about individuals in poverty as unmotivated, 
unintelligent, and lacking in self-control (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Lott, 2012; 
Saegert et al., 2007). Essentially, adults tend to assume that affluence is earned and 
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poverty is the result of a lack of effort. From early childhood through late adolescence 
children, too, endorse more positive attributes (e.g., smart, hardworking) about the rich 
and more negative attributes (e.g., dumb, lazy) about the poor (Mistry et al., 2015; 
Roussos & Dunham, 2016; Shutts et al., 2016; Sigelman, 2012; Woods et al., 2005). 
Thus, between childhood and adolescence, children are increasingly aware that 
greater wealth affords greater access to many important opportunities. However, one 
possibility is that children may view such economic inequality as justified, and believe 
that they would be justified in directing more resources and opportunities toward 
(deserving) advantaged groups. 
Potential positive impact. Conversely, if children view inequality of educational 
opportunities based on economic status as the unjust result of social processes, their 
interest in directing more opportunities towards disadvantaged groups is likely to be high. 
As outlined above, older children and adolescents increasingly recognize the importance 
of access to education in relation to later income (e.g., Arsenio et al., 2013; Flanagan et 
al., 2014). Additionally, several studies indicate that children and adolescents judge 
restriction of educational opportunities on the basis of other types of group membership 
negatively (e.g., Brown, 2006; Elenbaas et al., 2016).  
Thus, a second possibility is that children may reason that inequality of 
educational opportunity based on economic status is unfair, and that groups with less 
access in the past should receive more access in the present. Further supporting this 
possibility, research in social domain theory indicates that individuals evaluate, critique, 
and sometimes try to change norms that they judge to be unfair (Turiel, 2014; Wainryb & 
Recchia, 2014). When allocating resources, for example, older children take inequality 
16 
 
into account, distributing more items to a disadvantaged individual (Kienbaum & 
Wilkening, 2009; Li, Spitzer, & Olson, 2014; Paulus, 2014; Rizzo & Killen, 2016). 
Importantly, this possibility coincides with recent research drawing on the SRD 
model (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016b, 2017); when they make distribution decisions that bear 
on familiar inequalities in society, children do not necessarily replicate what they have 
observed. Rather, they often take advantage of the opportunity to equalize access to 
important resources. From this perspective, considering recipients’ economic status is 
actually necessary for the promotion of fairness. In fact, children must recognize that 
some groups have been unfairly disadvantaged and use that information when they have 
the opportunity to address inequalities. This same reasoning may apply with respect to 
children’s allocation of educational opportunities in a context of inequality based on 
economic status, but this possibility has not yet been tested.  
Role of child economic status in allocation decisions. Considerable important 
research has examined the effects of family socioeconomic status on numerous 
developmental outcomes (Duncan, Magnuson, & Votruba-Drzal, 2015; McLoyd, Mistry, 
& Hardaway, 2014). However, the exact role of children’s economic status on their 
decisions about how resources or opportunities should be distributed remains an open 
question.  
One possibility is that higher-income children and adolescents may be more likely 
to judge that other high-income children should receive access to opportunities. In 
general, higher-income adults are often more independent and self-focused than lower-
income adults (Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009; Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010; 
Stephens, Markus, & Townsend, 2007). These tendencies have been attributed to 
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differences in the amount of control and personal choice that individuals with more or 
fewer resources experience in their lives (Kraus, Piff, Mendoza-Denton, Rheinschmidt, & 
Keltner, 2012). In fact, there is some evidence that higher-income adults simply feel more 
entitled and deserving (in general) than others (Piff, 2014). Further, higher-income adults 
are less generous in donation contexts (Piff et al., 2010), less egalitarian in sharing 
contexts (Bratanova, Loughnan, Klein, & Wood, 2016), and more utilitarian in resource 
allocation contexts (Côté, Piff, & Willer, 2013).  
These findings suggest that higher-income children and adolescents, too, may be 
especially likely to believe that other high-income peers are entitled to opportunities. 
However, notably, differences in the generosity of lower- versus higher-income adults 
may only emerge in societies with a high level of economic inequality, or a high level of 
perceived inequality (Côté, House, & Willer, 2015). This further highlights the relevance 
of children’s perceptions of inequality in society for their judgments about how 
opportunities should be distributed. 
Another complementary possibility is that lower-income children and adolescents 
may be more aware of economic inequalities than their higher-income peers, and thus 
more likely to judge that other low-income children should receive access to 
opportunities. In regards to educational opportunities in particular, low-income older 
adolescents are conscious of potential barriers to their educational achievement (Arsenio 
et al., 2013; Diemer & Li, 2012; McWhirter & McWhirter, 2015; Taylor & Graham, 
2007). Likewise, stress related to family financial constraints contributes negatively to 
adolescents’ academic achievement, school engagement, and attitudes about education 
(Benner & Wang, 2014; Crosnoe, 2009; Mistry, Benner, Tan, & Kim, 2009). 
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Interestingly, low-income adults are more likely to reference barriers to opportunities 
(e.g., discrimination, political influence) when describing the causes of wealth and 
poverty (Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Kraus et al., 2009). These findings suggest that lower-
income children may be more aware of economic disparities than their higher-income 
peers. Whether or not this means that they would also make different moral judgments 
about fair access to educational opportunities, however, remains untested. 
A third possibility is that children may provide more opportunities for peers from 
their own economic background, particularly when they perceive an unmet need. Over 
and above ingroup bias in allocation decisions, children and adolescents are more attuned 
to the needs of members of their social ingroups than members of social outgroups 
(Abrams et al., 2015; Sierksma, Thijs, & Verkuyten, 2015; Weller & Lagattuta, 2013, 
2014). This suggests that, rather than an across-the-board support for or rejection of 
economic inequalities in access to opportunities, children’s decisions may be moderated 
by their perceptions that someone at least somewhat similar to them has been denied an 
opportunity in the past, entitling them to greater access in the present. 
Group economic status and allocation expectations. As mentioned above, 
children hold stereotypes about wealth and merit. Yet, when the question pertains to how 
groups might distribute resources, rather than how groups obtained their resources, other 
stereotypes may apply. Specifically, alongside perceptions of competence (i.e., 
hardworking, intelligent), adults perceive the wealthy as less warm (i.e., more 
competitive) (Cuddy et al., 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Children, too, may 
view high-wealth peers as more aggressive or competitive in seeking more resources for 
their own group. 
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However, one recent study found that 6 and 10-year-olds viewed “rich people” as 
both smarter and nicer than “poor people” (Roussos & Dunham, 2016). That is, unlike 
adults, children had difficulty entertaining the notion of a highly competent group that 
was not also high in warmth. These findings suggest the opposite possibility; children 
may expect high-wealth peers to be more generous than low-wealth peers when deciding 
how resources should be distributed. 
Taken together, the studies discussed in the preceding section (‘Children’s 
expectations for how groups allocate opportunities’) strongly suggest that, between early 
and middle childhood, children increasingly expect preferential allocation to ingroups as 
a general normative behavior in intergroup contexts. The studies outlined in the current 
section further indicate that they may also perceive different norms for under-resourced 
groups (reducing inequality) and well-resourced groups (maintaining their advantaged 
position). 
Specific Aims 
Many questions in social life revolve around who will or will not receive access to 
valuable opportunities. When determining how to respond to an inequality of opportunity 
based on group membership, children and adolescents must integrate their moral 
conceptions of fairness with their social awareness of intergroup relations. The proposed 
study had three main aims designed to extend previous research in moral development 
and intergroup relations in three key ways. 
Aim 1: How children allocate opportunities in a context of economic 
inequality. First, this study focused on children’s and adolescents’ allocation of 
educational opportunities to peers of high- and low-wealth status. This is a previously 
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unexplored, but highly salient, social context. Access to opportunities constitute a 
meaningful fairness issue in children’s everyday lives (e.g., Brown, 2006; Horn, 2003), 
and older children and early adolescents are increasingly aware that economic status is 
related to disparities in this area (e.g., Arsenio et al., 2013; Flanagan et al., 2014). Yet, 
very little is known regarding how children and adolescents reason about how 
educational opportunities should be allocated, particularly in a context of pre-existing 
group-based inequality. 
Aim 2: Children’s expectations for how others would allocate in the same 
context. Second, this study extended previous work at the intersection of moral 
development and developmental subjective group dynamics by identifying the allocation 
norms that children and adolescents expect high- and low-wealth groups to adhere to. By 
middle childhood, children define groups in terms of shared attitudes, beliefs, and 
behaviors (Abrams & Rutland, 2008). Yet less is known about children’s expectations for 
how others would allocate opportunities, especially in a context of pre-existing inequality 
when moral and group concerns may “pull” expectations in different directions (Elenbaas 
& Killen, 2016c). 
Aim 3: Role of recipient group and participant economic status in judgments 
and expectations. Third, this study tested a key, unique, prediction stemming from the 
SRD model (Killen, Elenbaas, et al., 2015), that knowledge about economic inequalities 
in access to opportunities could contribute to, rather than impede, the promotion of 
fairness in a context of intergroup inequality. Further, this study tested whether 
participant economic status would interact with recipient economic status to influence 




 As outlined in the three specific aims (above), this project investigated how 
children and adolescents respond to inequality of opportunity between economic groups. 
The sample included children ages 8-14 years old, evenly divided by gender, 
racially/ethnically representative of the mid-Atlantic region of the United States, and 
representing a range of economic backgrounds (details are provided in Chapter 3: 
Methodology).  
The age range of 8-14 years was chosen for several reasons. First, it is in late 
childhood and early adolescence that children begin to be able to integrate their 
awareness of social norms with their moral judgments about inequality in order to act on 
behalf of disadvantaged groups (Diemer & Rapa, 2016; Elenbaas & Killen, 2016b; 
Hughes & Bigler, 2011). Second, during this time children increasingly reason about 
discrimination, restriction of development, and rights when judging situations in which 
groups have been denied access to educational opportunities in particular (Brown, 2006; 
Helwig & Jasiobedzka, 2001; Horn, 2003; Killen et al., 2002; Peterson-Badali et al., 
2004; Ruck et al., 1998). Third, older children and adolescents expect individual 
members of groups to adhere to shared group norms (Abrams et al., 2003, 2008, 2009), 
and are increasingly aware that groups often act in their own interest (DeJesus et al., 
2014; Elenbaas & Killen, 2016c). 
General design and procedure. The central aims of the study pertained to 
children’s judgments, reasoning, and expectations in response to inequality of 
opportunity based on economic status. Chapter 3: Methodology provides details on the 
measures, including exact descriptions, questions, and response options. Broadly, this 
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study used an experimental vignette survey methodology successfully applied in previous 
studies on children’s decisions about resource allocation (Killen, Elenbaas, et al., 2015). 
The study entailed a between-subjects and within-subjects design. All participants 
completed three tasks (within-subjects): the Opportunity Allocation Task, the Allocation 
Norms Task, and the Inequality Perceptions Task. Please note that the entire survey (both 
versions) is available in Appendix C (Protocol). 
Economic Inequality Condition was the between-subjects factor. This referred to 
which group (high- or low-wealth) participants saw being excluded from access to the 
opportunity in the past. In one version of the protocol (randomized between participants) 
peers from families with “a little money” had not benefitted from the opportunity in the 
past, and in the other version peers from families with “a lot of money” had not 
benefitted from the opportunity in the past.  
All other factors were within-subjects. In the Opportunity Allocation Task, 
participants read about a special opportunity, described as both fun and educational, to 
which access has been restricted in the past based on wealth status. Then, participants 
learned that there was limited availability for the opportunity at present, and that children 
from both wealth backgrounds were interested in gaining access. Following this, 
participants made a series of judgments and decisions regarding possible ways to 
determine who should gain access to this opportunity. 
In the Allocation Norms Task, participants gave their expectations for how the 
two groups (high-wealth and low-wealth group) would prefer the opportunities to be 
allocated. Options included those represented in the previous task. In the Economic 
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Knowledge Task, participants reported their awareness of broader relations between 
wealth status and access to opportunities outside of the experimental paradigm. 
Hypotheses 
This study was designed to test hypotheses pertaining to each of the three aims 
outlined above. This section highlights the key hypotheses. Because Aim 3 relates back 
to Aims 1 and 2, this section is organized in terms of the predictions for children’s own 
allocation decisions followed by the predictions for their expectations for others’ 
allocation decisions. 
Children’s decisions. We predicted that children’s decisions about how access to 
an opportunity should be distributed would differ according to their awareness of broader 
economic inequalities in access to opportunities (H1). One possibility was that children 
who were more aware of economic inequality could evaluate admitting low-wealth peers 
more positively, reflecting concerns for fairness (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016b; Hughes & 
Bigler, 2011), and aligning with the predictions of the SRD model. However, another 
possibility was that children who were more aware of inequality could evaluate admitting 
high-wealth peers more positively, reflecting assumptions about wealth status and 
deservingness (Sigelman, 2012; Woods et al., 2005). 
We also predicted that children’s decisions would differ as a function of the 
camp’s past history of exclusion based on wealth group membership (H2), and that this 
effect would further depend on children’s own economic background (H3). When they 
have to give up something to help others, children are more likely to help members of 
their social ingroups than members of social outgroups (Abrams et al., 2015; Sierksma et 
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al., 2015; Weller & Lagattuta, 2014). This may also be the case in current study, where 
the situation is complex and more than one option may be perceived as appropriate. 
Finally, we tested whether children would prefer an impartial (“group blind”) 
approach over a more proactive one that guaranteed a given distribution of peers at the 
camp, but predicted that children would perceive that fairness in a context of inequality 
requires taking into consideration what one knows about intergroup relations (H4). This 
provided a further test of the prediction of the SRD model (fairness requires more than 
impartiality). We predicted, however that children who preferred the impartial strategy 
would be concerned with appearing unbiased and avoiding conflict (Grocke, Rossano, & 
Tomasello, 2015; Shaw & Olson, 2014). 
Children’s expectations. We predicted that, between middle childhood and early 
adolescence, children would increasingly expect the high- and low-wealth groups to 
prefer the approach that provided them the opportunity to attend the camp (over other 
approaches like equality) (H5). Due to their greater experience with social groups and 
greater social perspective taking abilities, older children are able to recognize that 
groups’ perspectives may differ from their own (Abrams et al., 2015; Nesdale, 2013). 
Further, older children expect others to share preferentially with ingroup members 
(DeJesus et al., 2014; Elenbaas & Killen, 2016c). This suggests that, between middle 
childhood and early adolescence, children may also expect others to provide 
opportunities preferentially to members of their own social groups. 
However, we predicted that children would perceive different underlying 
motivations for the high- and low-wealth groups’ preferences (H6). While both groups 
could be interested in benefitting their own group, children might view also the low-
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wealth group as secondarily concerned with addressing broader economic inequalities 
(Elenbaas & Killen, 2016c). 
Further, we predicted that family income would be related to children’s 
expectations for others’ allocation preferences (H7). Lower-income adolescents perceive 
barriers to their own access to opportunities (Arsenio et al., 2013; Taylor & Graham, 
2007), suggesting that lower-income children might be more likely to believe that others 
would attempt to gain access to opportunities for themselves. However, some research 
indicates that higher-income adults are, on average, more self-focused (Kraus et al., 2009; 
Piff, 2014; Stephens et al., 2007), suggesting that higher-income children may be more 
likely to believe that others would attempt to gain access to opportunities for themselves 
alone. Thus, two potential patterns of association were possible. 
In the context of predicting others’ behavior, children were expected to express 
stereotypes about both the high-wealth and low-wealth groups (H8). Most research has 
focused on children’s stereotypes about the wealthy as smart or hardworking and the poor 
as lacking these traits (Sigelman, 2012; Woods et al., 2005). On the other hand, adults 
hold stereotypes about the wealthy as greedy, selfish, or entitled (Fiske et al., 2002). 
Thus, a range of positive and negative stereotypes were expected. 
Outcomes, Impact, and Contribution 
This study was the first to examine children’s and adolescents’ judgments and 
reasoning regarding the allocation of opportunities to peers in a context of economic 
inequality. The results provide important information about moral development and 
conceptions of fairness regarding everyday intergroup disparities associated with 
economic status. Building on the theoretical foundation of the SRD model (Killen, 
26 
 
Elenbaas, et al., 2015), this study provided evidence for how children weigh awareness of 
inequality with moral reasoning about fairness when deciding how best to address 
everyday issues of unequal access to opportunities based on economic status. Chapter 4: 
Results, provides details on the findings. Overall, this study made four key contributions 
to the literature on moral development and intergroup relations.  
Distributive justice. First, this study extended prior work in distributive justice 
by focusing on the allocation of educational opportunities based on economic status, a 
previously unexplored, but highly salient, social context. Access to educational 
opportunities based on economic status constitute a meaningful fairness issue in 
children’s everyday lives. Building on recent studies indicating that children judge the 
denial of educational opportunities based on group membership to be wrong (e.g., Brown, 
2006; Helwig & Jasiobedzka, 2001), this study provided important evidence for how 
children reason that such opportunities should be allocated. 
Moral development in intergroup contexts. Second, the results of this study 
provided evidence for children’s recognition that, in a context of inequality, fairness 
requires more than impartiality. Rather, ensuring fair access to opportunities requires 
consideration of a past history of exclusion based on economic status. Extending recent 
research drawing on the SRD model (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016b, 2017), results from this 
study highlighted how knowledge about intergroup relations (in this case, knowledge 
about economic inequalities in access to opportunities) can contribute to the promotion of 
fairness in development. 
Subjective group dynamics and norms. Third, this study extended previous 
work at the intersection of moral development and developmental subjective group 
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dynamics by identifying the allocation norms that children expect others to adhere to. 
While previous work has shown that older children define group membership in terms of 
shared norms (Abrams & Rutland, 2008), less is known about children’s or adolescents’ 
expectations regarding allocation norms, or whether these differ by group status 
(Elenbaas & Killen, 2016c). Children’s recognition that others perspectives differ from 
their own when it comes to the allocation of opportunities reveals their developing 
knowledge about how inequality is perpetuated. 
Applied contributions. Fourth, beyond the implications of this study for 
understanding children’s social and moral development, the results have broader 
implications for educators and policy-makers interested in designing curricula and 
intervention programs that encourage consideration of economic inequality and fairness 
in development. Economic disparities in access to educational opportunities are a real and 
pressing social and moral concern (Duncan & Murnane, 2011). Findings from this study 
provided valuable foundational knowledge regarding children’s and adolescents’ 
everyday understanding of these issues, as well as their reasoning about exclusion and 
fair access. Determining whether children and adolescents view inequality of opportunity 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
In their everyday lives, children and adolescents make many decisions that 
involve concerns for fairness. In fact, reasoning about what is fair constitutes a core 
aspect of human morality throughout the lifespan (Killen & Smetana, 2015). Denial of 
resources has long been considered a central moral issue that invokes consideration of 
fairness, rights, and others’ welfare. In fact, children as young as 3 years of age recognize 
that denial of resources (e.g., monopolizing all the toys) is unfair (Smetana et al., 2014; 
Turiel, 1983). 
Along these same lines, the fair allocation of resources –or distributive justice– is 
considered a central context for investigating children’s moral development (Damon, 
1975; Piaget, 1932). Whereas children judge the denial of resources to be unfair from 
very early in development, children’s conceptions of the fair way to allocate resources 
undergo considerable developmental change. Many recent studies in this area have 
documented the origins and development of different moral concerns (e.g., equality, 
merit, need) when children allocate resources (see Killen et al., 2016 for a review). 
The concept of distributive justice is not, however, limited to the question of how 
to allocate tangible items between individuals. Important moral issues also arise with 
regard to the distribution of intangible, but valuable, opportunities (Wainryb et al., 2008). 
In fact, the unequal distribution of important opportunities constitutes a real and pressing 
social and moral concern, invoking issues of equality, rights, and fairness for adults and 
children (e.g., Brown, 2006; Helwig & Jasiobedzka, 2001). 
Importantly, decisions about how to distribute resources and opportunities often 
occur in intergroup contexts, where issues of bias and prejudice can influence decision-
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making throughout development (Killen et al., 2016). In these contexts, children must 
balance potentially competing concerns regarding fairness and the impact of different 
distribution decisions on recipients, as well as group norms and the importance of 
maintaining cohesion and a unified group identity (Killen et al., 2016).  
This review will outline theory and research on children’s decisions about the 
allocation of resources and opportunities. In particular, the review will highlight how 
children make these decisions in intergroup contexts, balancing social concerns for group 
norms against moral concerns for the fair treatment of others. Throughout, the focus will 
be on current research at the intersection of moral development and intergroup relations, 
emphasizing recent advances in this area and pointing to important topics for further 
investigation. The following section provides a brief overview of the aims of the review 
before moving into an analysis of the literature. 
Overview of the Literature Review 
As mentioned above, denial of resources has long been considered a central moral 
issue that invokes consideration of fairness. In fact, research in social domain theory has 
established that children as young as 3 years of age recognize that denial of resources is 
unfair, alongside other fundamental moral issues including the wrongfulness of inflicting 
physical or psychological harm on others (Smetana et al., 2014; Turiel, 1983). But how 
do children judge that resources should be allocated? Deeming the denial of resources to 
be wrong is different from proactively distributing them. This distinction has moral 
implications. The former issue entails a negative evaluation of a situation in which needs 
are not met, whereas the latter requires children to weigh multiple concerns to determine 
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the best course of action. The latter issue –children’s decisions regarding the distribution 
of resources and opportunities– is the focus of this review. 
Resources and opportunities. Many recent studies have investigated children’s 
decisions about the allocation of resources from a moral development perspective, 
resulting in important advances in understanding the origins and development of different 
fairness concerns (e.g., equality, merit) when children allocate items between peers. 
However, children’s decisions regarding the allocation of opportunities are an equally 
important topic for investigation.  
In many cases, concerns for fairness in the distribution of resources and the 
distribution of opportunities overlap. Both contexts can involve consideration of equality, 
for example. However, allocating opportunities may invoke moral concerns for children 
that are not often observed in contexts where tangible resources are being distributed. 
Decisions about how to fairly allocate opportunities often have important implications for 
recipients’ future wellbeing, requiring serious consideration of the implications of 
inequality for recipients. In fact, research on children’s judgments and reasoning about 
the denial of opportunities has revealed that such situations can invoke concerns for 
discrimination and rights for children and adolescents (e.g., Brown, 2006; Helwig & 
Jasiobedzka, 2001). These more abstract moral concepts reflect children’s consideration 
of the long-term impact of unfairly restricting access to opportunities. 
The majority of research in the area of resource allocation in development has 
focused on early childhood, investigating the emergence of moral concerns for equality, 
merit, and need between 3 and 8 years of age when children allocate resources (e.g., 
Baumard, Mascaro, & Chevallier, 2012; Rizzo et al., 2016; Schmidt et al., 2016). By 
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contrast, most research on developing knowledge about inequality of opportunity has 
focused on adolescence, examining, for example, conceptions of fair government and 
freedoms (Helwig et al., 2014), political and social involvement (Diemer et al., 2016), 
explanations for economic inequality (Flanagan et al., 2014), and perceptions of how 
wealth is distributed in the United States (Arsenio et al., 2013). Less is known regarding 
children’s knowledge of broader inequalities in access to opportunities, or perceptions of 
how opportunities should be distributed. 
Yet, with increasing social experience, children are able to make connections 
between resource inequality and broader group-based disparities in society (e.g., 
Elenbaas & Killen, 2016a; Mistry et al., 2015). Thus, these two issues –allocation of 
resources and allocation of opportunities– have many moral foundations in common, but 
also invoke unique concerns for fairness that warrant investigation. This review will 
pinpoint where the results of studies on the allocation of resources and the allocation of 
opportunities diverge and where they converge, with the aim of highlighting key areas for 
further investigation. 
Fairness, equity, and concerns for others’ welfare. Further, distribution 
decisions in childhood have often been examined with regard to the allocation of certain 
types of familiar and desirable resources (e.g., candy, toys). However, recent research 
indicates that older children distinguish between resources like these versus resources 
that are necessary for ensuring wellbeing when making allocation decisions (Rizzo et al., 
2016). When allocating necessary resources, older children consider issues of others’ 
welfare and rights, in addition to concerns for equality and fairness (Elenbaas & Killen, 
2016b). This review will outline what is known about the allocation of familiar and 
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desirable resources (e.g., stickers, snacks), and point to new and important directions for 
future research with regard to the allocation of different types of goods and opportunities 
with stronger implications for recipients’ wellbeing. 
Intergroup contexts. Importantly, allocation decisions in intergroup contexts 
involve additional social considerations, beyond those moral concerns invoked in within-
group allocation decisions (Killen et al., 2016). Distribution decisions can be 
multifaceted, involving moral concerns for fairness as well as social concerns about 
norms and expectations. For example, in intergroup contexts children must navigate 
potentially competing concerns regarding fair treatment with attitudes about others based 
on their ingroup or outgroup membership (e.g., Elenbaas et al., 2016; Olson et al., 2011).  
In fact, considerable research at the intersection of allocation and intergroup 
attitudes has focused on the negative aspects of intergroup attitudes (e.g., conformity, 
prejudice). Many studies have revealed young children’s ingroup bias when allocating, 
for example, more resources to members of their racial and gender ingroups than to racial 
and gender outgroup members (e.g., Dunham et al., 2011; Renno & Shutts, 2015). 
However, in some cases, awareness or knowledge about intergroup relations can 
contribute to, rather than impede, the promotion of fairness in childhood (e.g., Diemer & 
Rapa, 2016; Elenbaas & Killen, 2016b; Hughes & Bigler, 2011). This review will 
examine both sides of the issue by outlining research indicating that consideration of 
group membership promotes preferential or unfair allocation, usually to benefit ingroup 
members, as well as research indicating that, in some cases, consideration of group 
membership is useful for achieving a fair allocation. This second perspective is fairly new 
to the field, thus attention will be given to reporting and interpreting recent studies 
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demonstrating that, when children have knowledge about unfair intergroup relations in 
the past, they can use that knowledge to advocate for fair relations between groups in the 
present. 
Norms and expectations. Along these same lines, this review will stress the need 
for more research on children’s awareness of the allocation norms that groups hold. 
Children’s awareness of norms and expectations around the distribution of resources and 
opportunities, and particularly intergroup allocation norms, are powerful predictors of 
their own allocation decisions (McGuire, Rutland, & Nesdale, 2015). Further, changing 
local and peer group norms about resource and opportunity distribution can impact 
children’s own distribution decisions (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Mulvey et al., 2014). 
These findings suggest that children are susceptible to fair and unfair norms around 
intergroup allocation. But few studies have investigated the actual norms that children 
expect groups to hold. Children’s knowledge of group allocation norms has the potential 
to reveal their developing awareness of how resources and opportunities move through 
social systems, and who might be expected to benefit (or not benefit) as a result 
(Elenbaas & Killen, 2016c). 
Economic status and fair distribution. Finally, but importantly, while several 
studies have focused on intergroup allocation contexts involving the social categories of 
race and gender, less is known regarding children’s decisions about the allocation of 
resources and opportunities between individuals and groups that differ in economic 
status. Economic status is, however, a highly salient type of group membership in 
children’s everyday lives (Mistry et al., 2015). Notably, economic status is closely related 
to actual access to resources and opportunities in childhood and adulthood, and older 
34 
 
children and adolescents recognize this connection (Chafel & Neitzel, 2005; Flanagan et 
al., 2014).  
This review argues that, despite receiving little attention in the distributive justice 
literature to date, economic status is a highly relevant type of group membership for 
investigation with regard to children’s allocation decisions. Like other intergroup 
contexts, allocation to individuals or groups that vary in wealth may invoke intergroup 
biases (e.g., preferential allocation to the ingroup) for children, but it may also invoke 
strong concerns for inequality and need (e.g., Ongley et al., 2014; Shutts et al., 2016), as 
well as strong assumptions about entitlement (e.g., Sigelman, 2012; Woods et al., 2005) 
that are less readily assessed in other intergroup contexts. 
Overview. Children draw on their developing moral concerns for fairness, as well 
as developing social concerns for group norms and expectations, when making allocation 
decisions. There are times when these different concerns may be in conflict, and thus an 
integrative theoretical model is helpful for understanding children’s distribution decisions 
in intergroup contexts. Killen and Rutland’s social reasoning developmental (SRD) 
model (Killen, Elenbaas, et al., 2015; Rutland et al., 2010) has guided several recent 
studies in this area. Bridging research on children’s social development and moral 
development, this model provides a framework for interpreting what is known about 
distribution decisions in intergroup contexts thus far, and for identifying relevant issues 
for investigation regarding children’s everyday distribution decisions. This next section 
introduces the social reasoning developmental (SRD) model as a guide for the subsequent 
analysis of research in this area. 
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Social Reasoning Developmental Model 
Killen and Rutland’s social reasoning developmental (SRD) model (Killen, 
Elenbaas, et al., 2015; Rutland et al., 2010) integrates the social domain theory 
perspective on moral development (Smetana et al., 2014; Turiel, 2006) with 
developmental social identity theories (Nesdale, 2004; Verkuyten, 2007) and theories of 
group dynamics in childhood (Abrams & Rutland, 2008). This model proposes that, when 
children make decisions –including distribution decisions– in social contexts, they reason 
about multiple moral and social considerations, weighing their moral concerns for 
fairness with their developing knowledge about how groups function. 
Social domain theory. Research in developmental psychology from the 
perspective of social domain theory (Nucci, 1981; Turiel, 1983) has provided evidence 
that, when reasoning about social contexts, events, and interactions, children consider 
three central domains of knowledge: moral, societal, and personal. The moral domain 
pertains to issues of fairness, justice, and rights. The societal domain pertains to issues of 
norms, conventions, and expectations. The personal domain pertains to issues of 
individual prerogative, choice, or preference. Extensive research has demonstrated that 
these forms of knowledge are central to social life, and are reflected in the reasoning of 
adults and children considering both straightforward and complex social contexts 
(Smetana et al., 2014). 
When determining how to allocate resources or opportunities in intergroup 
contexts, children must weigh moral concerns about fairness with societal concerns about 
group norms and expectations as well as personal prerogatives. Children care about 
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equity and justice, and there are many instances in which they adhere to these principles 
rather than using group stereotypes or negative assumptions to guide allocation decisions. 
Developmental social identity theories. Research in social psychology from the 
perspective of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) has long held that 
individuals are motivated to view their ingroup (i.e., members of the social group(s) that 
they belong to) favorably, and that this can lead to biases against or dislike of members of 
relevant outgroups. Children also exhibit preference for ingroup members, seek to present 
a positive image of themselves to their ingroup, and sometimes bolster their sense of 
group identity by allocating resources preferentially to ingroup others (Nesdale, 2004; 
Verkuyten, 2007). 
Preference for one’s ingroup does not always lead to dislike or denial of resources 
for relevant outgroups, however. Whether or not children exhibit biases against relevant 
outgroups varies as a function of how strongly they identify with their ingroup, whether 
or not they feel that their ingroup is being threatened, and their perceptions of group 
norms and expectations around prejudicial treatment of outgroup members (FitzRoy & 
Rutland, 2010; Nesdale, Griffiths, Durkin, & Maass, 2007; Nesdale, Maass, Durkin, & 
Griffiths, 2005; Rutland, Cameron, Milne, & McGeorge, 2005). 
Developmental subjective group dynamics. Group norms have also been a 
focus of research in the area of developmental subjective group dynamics (Abrams & 
Rutland, 2008). This work has demonstrated that, beginning around 8 years of age, 
children begin to define group membership and identity in terms of a set of shared norms, 
traditions, and histories, in addition to external, observable characteristics (e.g., skin color 
for race, hair length for gender) (Abrams et al., 2003, 2009). Older children and 
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adolescents expect individuals to endorse these shared norms in order to ensure the 
smooth functioning of the group, and in order to sustain their group membership (Abrams 
et al., 2008), as non-adherence to a group norm can be considered grounds for exclusion 
(Mulvey & Killen, 2015). 
Yet, while many studies have examined children’s evaluations of individuals who 
deviate from established group norms, including some work on norms about resource 
allocation, less is known regarding the actual norms that children expect groups to hold. 
When determining how others (e.g., individual members of social groups) would allocate 
resources or opportunities, children must consider how others may be bound by group 
expectations that differ from children’s own personal views.   
SRD model and children’s allocation decisions. The SRD model’s dual focus 
on moral (e.g., fairness) and group (e.g., norms and expectations) concerns is especially 
applicable for research on children’s and adolescents’ perspectives on access to and 
distribution of resources and opportunities in intergroup contexts. Notably, most research 
on intergroup relations in development focuses on the emergence of stereotypes, biases, 
conformity, or discrimination (i.e., the negative aspects of intergroup attitudes). However, 
when a group has been excluded from access to a resource or opportunity, taking group 
membership into account can be necessary for ensuring fair access in the future. 
In fact, one key, unique, prediction of the SRD model is that, in some contexts, 
knowledge about intergroup relations can contribute to, rather than impede, the 
promotion of fairness (Killen, Elenbaas, et al., 2015). That is, as children gain awareness 
of group processes, their social knowledge about norms and expectations combined with 
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their increasingly sophisticated moral judgments, can actually help them to counter –
rather than replicate– unfair allocation norms. 
The following sections will reference these three central theories (social domain 
theory, developmental social identity theories, and developmental subjective group 
dynamics), as well as their integrated application in the SRD model, in order to interpret 
foundational and current research revealing the implications of social and moral concerns 
when children make allocation decisions in within-group and intergroup contexts. 
Children Consider Multiple Moral Concerns when Making Distribution Decisions 
Research on allocation decisions in childhood has focused primarily on the 
emergence and development of moral concerns for equality, merit, and need when 
distributing resources between individuals who do not vary in social group membership 
(i.e., within-group contexts). This section outlines what is known about the development 
of children’s concerns for equality, merit, and need when allocating resources. Further, 
distribution decisions have often been examined with regard to the allocation of certain 
types of familiar and desirable resources (e.g., candy, toys). However, recent research 
indicates that, when making distribution decisions, older children distinguish between 
resources like these versus resources that are necessary for ensuring wellbeing (Rizzo et 
al., 2016). When allocating more necessary resources, older children consider issues of 
others’ welfare and rights, in addition to issues of equality and fairness (Elenbaas & 
Killen, 2016b). Thus, this section points to new directions for research with regard to the 
allocation of different types of goods and opportunities.  
Importantly, whereas early research in this area focused on children’s allocation 
decisions in contexts where recipients had competing claims over resources (e.g., merit 
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versus need) in order to measure how children prioritize one claim over another (Damon, 
1975, 1980; Enright et al., 1984), recent studies have focused on children’s consideration 
of individual claims in isolation, in order to identify the earliest origins of children’s 
concern for single issues, like merit, when allocating resources. 
Emergence of moral concerns. Concerns for equality, merit, and need all emerge 
early in development when children allocate resources. For example, children as young as 
3 years of age reward those who work harder with a larger share of resources like candy 
or stickers (Baumard et al., 2012; Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012; Liénard, Chevallier, 
Mascaro, Kiura, & Baumard, 2013). Likewise children as young as 4 years of age give 
more resources like toys and snacks to those who have less to begin with (Li et al., 2014; 
Paulus, 2014; Rizzo & Killen, 2016). 
Some research suggests that concern for equality in resource allocation emerges 
as early as the second year of life (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Sloane, Baillargeon, & 
Premack, 2012; Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun, & Burns, 2013; Ulber, Hamann, & 
Tomasello, 2015), while classical and contemporary findings converge to suggest that 
preference for equality is strong from early childhood through adolescence (Damon, 
1975; Enright et al., 1984; Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008; Rochat et al., 2009; 
Shaw & Olson, 2012; Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991). Further, older children are able to 
balance competing merit and need claims when allocating limited resources, and seek 
ways to “even out” inequalities while also recognizing hard work (Carson & Banuazizi, 
2008; Kienbaum & Wilkening, 2009; Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991).  
Overall, between early childhood and early adolescence, children demonstrate 
awareness of which claims to resources are legitimate moral claims (e.g., based on merit 
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or need) and which are not. As one example, whereas 3 year olds generally allocate 
resources equally between recipients, 5 year-olds give more to a recipient with a claim to 
a resource than a recipient with no claim, and 8 year-olds distinguish between different 
types of claims, allocating more resources to a meritorious or needy individual than to an 
individual who merely stated that they wanted more resources (Schmidt et al., 2016). 
Importantly, around 6 years of age concerns for merit and need more clearly take priority 
over concerns for equality in children’s allocation decisions (Rizzo & Killen, 2016; Shaw 
& Olson, 2013). That is, older children choose to allocate based on merit or need even 
when they could distribute equally, demonstrating their capacity to prioritize these more 
complex moral claims. These studies highlight the early emergence and continued 
development of children’s consideration of multiple moral concerns when allocating 
resources.  
Potential developmental mechanisms. Generally, research in this area has been 
concerned with charting the earliest origins of, and age-related changes in, children’s 
decisions about how to distribute resources. However, some research has also directly 
investigated the social-cognitive and socioemotional mechanisms underlying these 
developmental changes. Age-related changes in children’s decisions about resource 
distribution between early and middle childhood have been attributed to increases in 
social-cognitive competencies including Theory of Mind (Brown, 2006; Fu, Xiao, Killen, 
& Lee, 2014; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011; Mulvey, 
Buchheister, & McGrath, 2016; Rochat et al., 2009; Takagishi, Kameshima, Schug, 
Koizumi, & Yamagishi, 2010; Wu & Su, 2014) and social perspective taking (Abrams et 
al., 2015; Sierksma, Thijs, Verkuyten, & Komter, 2014), as well as increases in socio-
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emotional understanding including empathy (Abrams et al., 2015; Piff et al., 2010; 
Sierksma et al., 2015; Sierksma, Thijs, & Verkuyten, 2014), sympathy (Daniel, Dys, 
Buchmann, & Malti, 2016; Malti, Gummerum, Keller, & Buchmann, 2009; Ongley & 
Malti, 2014; Ongley et al., 2014), and attributions of negative emotions to those who are 
denied resources and those who deny resources to others (Arsenio et al., 2013; 
Gummerum, Hanoch, Keller, Parsons, & Hummel, 2010; LoBue, Nishida, Chiong, 
DeLoache, & Haidt, 2011; Ongley & Malti, 2014; Weller & Lagattuta, 2013, 2014; 
Williams, O’Driscoll, & Moore, 2014).  
Many of these same social-cognitive and socio-emotional competencies are also 
relevant to children’s decisions about resource allocation in intergroup contexts. 
Throughout this review, potential mechanisms for developmental change in children’s 
coordination of fairness and social group concerns in intergroup distribution contexts will 
be discussed. 
Distributive justice and procedural justice. While distributive justice (or 
resource allocation) often focuses on the final distribution of items between recipients, an 
appreciation for procedural justice entails consideration of the means by which resources 
are allocated. When all recipients have equal claims to resources, but there are not 
enough resources to allocate equally to everyone, children as young as 5-6 years of age 
prefer to use procedures that allow for equality of opportunity (Grocke et al., 2015; Shaw 
& Olson, 2014). That is, young children recognize that some inequality between 
recipients is acceptable, so long as the procedure that generated it was impartial (e.g., 




Importantly, by 8 years of age, however, children prioritize merit and need claims 
over employing an impartial or random allocation procedure (Shaw & Olson, 2014). That 
is, older children are better able to balance the need for procedural justice and distributive 
justice, determining that correcting inequalities, for example, takes precedence over using 
an impartial or allocation procedure. Similar to the findings above on children’s 
developing ability to weigh multiple moral concerns when allocating resources, these 
studies illustrate older children’s capacity to consider fairness in terms of both methods 
and outcomes. Moving beyond judgments of which way is fairest, older children 
recognize which end state is fairest, and moderate their allocation decisions accordingly. 
Resource allocation and sharing. Although this review focuses on third party 
resource allocation decisions from the perspective of moral development, it is important 
to note that related research has examined allocation decisions from a cooperative or 
evolutionary perspective, focusing on when children share resources with others. This 
work has shown that young children share resources equally with those who collaborate 
with them (Warneken, Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011), but not with those who do not 
contribute to the resource acquisition effort (Melis, Altrichter, & Tomasello, 2013). 
Young children also share resources with others proportional to the amount of work that 
each party contributed (Hamann, Bender, & Tomasello, 2014; Kanngiesser & Warneken, 
2012), even when they could monopolize resources for themselves (Brownell, Svetlova, 
& Nichols, 2009). 
Linking this research on sharing with the moral developmental perspective on 
fairness in third party judgments, children also reward others who are prosocial (i.e.,  who 
demonstrate helping behavior towards others) with a greater share of resources than those 
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who are antisocial from as early as 4 years of age (Kenward & Dahl, 2011). These 
findings suggest that young children distinguish between fair and unfair treatment when 
evaluating other people’s behavior, and moderate their own distribution decisions 
accordingly.  
Likewise, when they have the option to give some of their resources to another 
person, preschoolers respond to others’ needs, choosing to give a sticker or snack, for 
example, to a recipient in need rather than keeping it for themselves (Chernyak & 
Kushnir, 2013; Dunfield, Kuhlmeier, O’Connell, & Kelley, 2011; Engelmann, Herrmann, 
Rapp, & Tomasello, 2016; Malti et al., 2015), and soliciting assistance from another 
person when they have few resources to give (Paulus, Gillis, Li, & Moore, 2013). Thus, 
not only do young children judge it fair to address others’ needs in third party allocation 
contexts, in some cases they are also willing to give up their own resources in order to do 
so. Complementing these findings, older children evaluate other individuals who give 
away a greater proportion of their own resources to others as “nicer” (McCrink, Bloom, 
& Santos, 2010; Ng, Heyman, & Barner, 2011). 
Fairness depends on the implications for recipients. Recently, research in this 
area has expanded to include more nuanced investigations of children’s capacity to take 
into consideration factors like the value (Shaw & Olson, 2013), desirability (Blake & 
Rand, 2010), or rarity (Chernyak & Sobel, 2015) of the resource being distributed when 
making third party allocation decisions. As one example, recent studies by Rizzo and 
colleagues (2016) have demonstrated that, by 6-8 years of age, children distinguish 
between familiar and desirable resources like candy and toys versus resources that a 
necessary for ensuring recipients’ wellbeing (e.g., items like food and medicine) when 
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making allocation decisions. That is, by 6-8 years of age, children distinguish between 
resources described as luxuries and resources described as necessities, allocating more of 
the former to a recipient who worked hard, allocating the latter equally between 
recipients, and reasoning about others’ wellbeing when allocating resources described as 
necessary (Rizzo et al., 2016). These findings spotlight children’s developing capacity to 
take into consideration the impactions of different distribution decisions on the wellbeing 
of resource recipients, weighing merit and others’ welfare when determining how best to 
distribute different types of resources. 
Building on this approach, recent studies drawing on the SRD model have 
revealed that, when allocating important resources including school and medical supplies, 
older children reference the wrongfulness of preferential treatment and the importance of 
equal access to these types of resources (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016b, 2017). While 
children do reference issues of fairness and equality when allocating resources like treats 
and stickers, children’s conceptions of fair allocation broaden to include larger issues, 
including rights to resources, when they allocate items with stronger implications for 
recipients’ wellbeing. For example, Elenbaas and colleagues found that 10-11 year-olds 
often referenced preferential treatment when reasoning about the causes of an inequality 
of school supplies between groups (Elenbaas & Killen, 2017), and increasingly 
referenced children’s rights to adequate medical care when deciding how to allocate 
hospital supplies in the context of a group-based inequality (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016b).  
Thus, children are aware that unfair distribution of certain types of resources can 
have a detrimental impact on recipients’ welfare from the early elementary years (e.g., 
Engelmann et al., 2016; Malti et al., 2015), and by the end of the elementary years they 
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are aware that different types of resources can and should be allocated differently, 
depending on the implications of these decisions for recipients (Elenbaas & Killen, 
2016b, e.g., 2017; Rizzo et al., 2016). These studies provide further evidence for how 
children coordinate different moral concerns (e.g., others’ welfare and the wrongfulness 
of preferential treatment), particularly when allocating resources that invoke these more 
long-term fairness considerations. 
Moral Concerns about Access to Opportunities 
As mentioned above, less is known regarding children’s decisions and reasoning 
about the fair distribution of opportunities (relative to the fair distribution of resources). 
However, interestingly, many of the aforementioned moral concerns (e.g., others’ rights, 
the wrongfulness of discrimination) also emerge in children’s reasoning about the 
wrongfulness of denying opportunities to individuals or groups.  
Denial of access to opportunities. Much of the research in this area to date has 
focused on children’s judgments about the denial of access to extra educational 
opportunities (e.g., the opportunity to be class leader or participate in a science fair). 
Denial of educational opportunities, in particular, reflects a pervasive social inequality 
(Duncan & Murnane, 2011) that raises important moral questions about justice and rights 
for children and adults (Wainryb et al., 2008). For example, references to discrimination 
and the importance of obtaining knowledge have been observed in 5-10 year-olds 
reasoning about the denial of educational opportunities (Brown, 2006; Helwig & 
Jasiobedzka, 2001), and references to children’s rights to education have been observed 
in 9-17 year-olds’ reasoning in similar contexts (Horn, 2003; Killen et al., 2002). 
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Parallel to the research on children’s distribution of necessary resources (e.g., 
food, medical supplies) described above, findings from studies of children’s judgments 
about the denial of educational opportunities reveal the emergence and development of 
more complex and multifaceted moral concerns in distribution contexts. Adolescents are 
able to reason about such abstract social and moral issues as fair government and 
freedoms (Helwig et al., 2014) and the institutional causes of economic inequality 
(Arsenio et al., 2013; Flanagan et al., 2014). Yet, reasoning about these complex issues is 
built on a foundation of understanding fairness in childhood. Indeed, the research 
reviewed above reveals that children are aware that important opportunities are 
distributed unequally from as early as the elementary years (Brown, 2006; Elenbaas & 
Killen, 2017; Helwig & Jasiobedzka, 2001). Yet much more research is needed in order 
to understand what children know about broader inequalities in access to opportunities 
and how children perceive that opportunities should be allocated. 
Rights to resources and opportunities. Focusing on these types of resources and 
opportunities (e.g., school supplies, access to education) raises the relevance of related 
work on children’s understanding of rights in everyday life. Research in this area 
indicates that children often endorse their own nurturance rights, or rights to adequate 
care including emotional support from parents and protection from physical harm, as well 
as self-determination rights including the right to autonomous decision-making, from as 
early as 9-10 years of age (Ruck, Tenenbaum, & Willenberg, 2011). Understanding of 
individuals’ and groups’ rights to societal resources in a broader sense, including the 
detrimental impact of violating such rights, develops in middle childhood and 
adolescence (Helwig et al., 2014). By 9-11 years of age, for example, children support 
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their own and others’ rights to quality education (Peterson-Badali et al., 2004), and 
between 8 and 16 years, children increasingly reference education when asked what 
rights children have (Ruck et al., 1998). 
While most research in this area has focused on the extent to which children and 
adolescents endorse their own and other’s rights, such as the right to visit a doctor when 
ill, or the right to go to school, understanding rights like these can be linked back to 
children’s own decisions about the allocation of resources (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016b). 
The responsibility to provide children with access to societal resources like medical care 
and education does not rest on parents alone. Accordingly, children’s decisions regarding 
how to provide resources and opportunities to others and their stated support of their own 
and others’ rights in such contexts may be related, as both pertain to moral conceptions of 
equity and justice. 
Distribution in Intergroup Contexts: Children Balance Moral and Group Concerns 
In intergroup contexts children must navigate potentially competing concerns for 
fairness and group dynamics when distributing resources or opportunities. That is, 
children must balance moral concerns regarding the treatment of others (broadly) with 
social group concerns regarding the treatment of others based on their ingroup or 
outgroup membership (Killen et al., 2016). Many studies at the intersection of resource 
allocation and intergroup attitudes have focused on the negative aspects of intergroup 
attitudes (e.g., conformity, prejudice). But, in some cases, awareness or knowledge about 
intergroup relations can contribute to, rather than impede, the promotion of fairness in 
childhood. This section will examine both sides of the issue, outlining research indicating 
that consideration of group membership promotes preferential or unfair allocation, as 
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well as research indicating that, in some cases, consideration of group membership is in 
fact essential for achieving a fair allocation. When children have knowledge about unfair 
intergroup relations in the past, for example, they can use that knowledge to advocate for 
fair relations between groups in the present. 
Ingroup bias and preferential allocation. Most of the research examining social 
group concerns in children’s allocation decisions has focused on young children’s 
preferential allocation to ingroup members. For instance, preschoolers allocate more 
resources like snacks, toys, and stickers to their friends than to strangers (McGillicuddy-
De Lisi, Watkins, & Vinchur, 1994; McGuigan, Fisher, & Glasgow, 2016; Moore, 2009; 
Olson & Spelke, 2008; Paulus & Moore, 2014), and to members of their racial (Monteiro, 
de França, & Rodrigues, 2009; Renno & Shutts, 2015; Zinser, Rich, & Bailey, 1981), 
gender (Dunham et al., 2011; Renno & Shutts, 2015), linguistic (Kinzler, Dupoux, & 
Spelke, 2007), school (Fehr et al., 2008), and minimal (Abrams et al., 2015; Benozio & 
Diesendruck, 2015; Dunham et al., 2011; Rhodes, Leslie, Saunders, Dunham, & 
Cimpian, 2017; Spielman, 2000) ingroups than to racial, gender, linguistic, school, and 
minimal outgroup members. 
A predominant interpretation of children’s tendency to allocate more resources to 
members of their social group hinges on the assumption that children prefer members of 
their own social groups. Although few studies directly measure relations between social 
group preference and resource allocation decisions, there is evidence that children’s 
preferential allocation to friends (McGuigan et al., 2016), gender ingroup members 
(Renno & Shutts, 2015), and minimal ingroup members (Dunham et al., 2011) is related 
to their explicit preference for members of these social groups. One study even found that 
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3-6 year-olds allocated more stickers to their friends than to disliked peers who had 
almost no stickers (Paulus, 2016). Further, children’s expectations for how others will 
allocate resources are related to their perceptions that others prefer members of their own 
social group (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016c). 
Stereotypes and differential allocation. These examples of ingroup bias 
(preferential distribution of resources to benefit one’s ingroup) are corroborated by young 
children’s use of group stereotypes to determine who should or should not be granted the 
opportunity to join social groups and share group resources. For example, gender 
stereotypes about play preferences are prevalent in early childhood, and preschoolers use 
these stereotypes to determine whether a boy or a girl should be allowed to join a gender-
stereotypic activity (e.g., including a boy or girl to play with dolls) (Killen, Pisacane, 
Lee-Kim, & Ardila-Rey, 2001; Theimer, Killen, & Stangor, 2001). Thus, many children 
are denied opportunities (by other children) because of stereotypes about social group 
membership. 
Unfortunately, stereotypes can take subtle forms that result in unfair treatment of 
others, even in children who are not explicitly aware of their biases. For instance, one 
study found that European-American 9-10 year-olds allocated more money to a needy 
recipient depicted as European-American than to a needy recipient depicted as African-
American (McGillicuddy-De Lisi et al., 2006), and another study found that 11-12 year-
olds allocated more money to a needy recipient depicted as a friend than to a needy 
recipient depicted as a stranger (McGillicuddy-De Lisi et al., 1994). These findings 
suggest that older children may “give the benefit of the doubt” to certain social groups 
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(e.g., European-Americans, friends) who are in need, distributing more resources to them 
than to other social groups in the same circumstances.  
Thus, in addition to explicitly distributing more resources to an ingroup member 
over an outgroup member, group-related biases in older children’s and adolescents’ 
distribution decisions can be subtle, reflecting a lack of attention to the resource needs of 
outgroup members rather than a clear cut denial of resources on the basis of group 
membership. Further, some work indicates that mere observation of a resource inequality 
between racial groups or novel groups can lead younger and older children to assume that 
the disparity is legitimate or deserved, and to perpetuate it themselves by allocating more 
goods to a member of an advantaged group (Horwitz et al., 2014; Li et al., 2014; Olson et 
al., 2011). 
Intergroup attitudes and inequality. Together, these findings reveal how 
negative intergroup attitudes are pervasive throughout childhood and adolescence, and 
often result in biased or preferential allocation decisions. The impact of stereotypes and 
assumptions about deservingness on children’s distribution decisions cannot be 
overstated. Preferential allocation of resources or opportunities on the basis of group 
membership is a form of discrimination and a foundation of social inequality (Killen, 
Hitti, Cooley, & Elenbaas, 2015). As these biases emerge in childhood, it is imperative 
that future studies address the question of how intergroup contexts and intergroup 
relations impact children’s allocation decisions, as attitudes and behaviors established in 
childhood can continue in adulthood, perpetuating a damaging cycle of exclusion and 
disadvantage (Abrams & Killen, 2014; Rutland & Killen, 2015). 
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Fortunately, there is some evidence that, under certain circumstances, ingroup 
biases in children’s resource allocation decisions can decrease in later childhood and 
adolescence, as children recognize the impact of differential allocation on recipient’s 
wellbeing (Elenbaas et al., 2016; Jordan, McAuliffe, & Warneken, 2014). For example, 
Elenbaas and colleagues (2016) investigated 5-6 and 10-11 year-olds’ judgments about 
how educational resources should be allocated following familiarization with an 
inequality of school supplies between peers of different racial backgrounds. Younger 
children’s responses to the inequality reflected a form of ingroup bias; they only 
corrected the disparity when their racial ingroup was at a disadvantage, demonstrating 
more mixed responses when the outgroup was at a disadvantage. Older children, 
however, reasoned about the importance of equal access to school supplies and correcting 
past disparities. These 10-11 year-olds judged the inequality negatively, allocated more 
school supplies to the group that they had seen receiving fewer supplies, and supported 
the actions of others who did the same, regardless of whether their ingroup or the 
outgroup was disadvantaged.  
This study highlights the emergence of children’s concern for equality where 
access to education and educational resources is concerned, bridging research on resource 
allocation and rights. Along these same lines, related research indicates that 8-13 year-
olds help both friends and strangers who are hurt or ill (Sierksma et al., 2015), donate 
money to families of their own nationality or another nationality who have experienced a 
natural disaster (Sierksma, Thijs, & Verkuyten, 2014), and evaluate the refusal to help as 
wrong regardless of whether the peer in need is an ethnic ingroup or outgroup member 
(Sierksma, Thijs, Verkuyten, et al., 2014).  
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What these studies have in common is a focus on high-stakes (or necessary) 
resources like educational or medical supplies (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016b; Elenbaas et al., 
2016) or high-need recipients who are hurt, ill, or afraid (Sierksma et al., 2015; Sierksma, 
Thijs, Verkuyten, et al., 2014). This suggests that, for older children (whose 
understanding of others’ emotions and of the consequences of lacking a resource are 
more developed) moral concerns can outweigh social group affiliations when the 
consequences of unfair allocation are especially severe. Nevertheless, more research is 
needed in order to determine how allocation decisions in intergroup contexts change 
between childhood and adolescence as a function of the resource being allocated. Studies 
approaching the same intergroup issues have sometimes revealed contrasting results (see, 
for example Elenbaas et al., 2016; Olson et al., 2011), indicating that, when making 
allocation decisions in these contexts, children consider many more factors than 
previously anticipated. 
Awareness of intergroup relations can promote fair decisions. As reviewed 
above, in many contexts, negative intergroup attitudes promote preferential allocation and 
the maintenance of unfair inequalities. However, recent studies drawing on the SRD 
model have revealed that, in some cases, awareness or knowledge about intergroup 
relations can contribute to, rather than impede, the promotion of fairness in childhood 
(Elenbaas & Killen, 2016b, 2017). 
For instance, in a recent study drawing on the SRD model to examine children’s 
allocation of hospital supplies (e.g., bandages, thermometers), Elenbaas and colleagues 
(2016b) found evidence for the joint roles of moral judgment and knowledge about 
intergroup relations in children’s resource allocation decisions. Between early and middle 
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childhood, children judged an inequality of hospital supplies between African-American 
and European-American children increasingly negatively. At the same time, they 
demonstrated increasing awareness of broader links between race and wealth outside of 
the experimental context (see also Elenbaas & Killen, 2016a). These changes in moral 
judgments and social knowledge mediated the relation between age (5-6 versus 10-11 
years) and children’s increasing support for rectifying the hospital supply inequality, 
specifically when African-American groups were being denied resources.  
In this example, older children recognized which social groups were the habitual 
targets of certain forms of discrimination and inequality, including, in this case, restricted 
access to quality medical care due to economic disparities. Importantly, when they had 
the opportunity to address discriminatory resource inequalities, older children in this 
study used their social knowledge to take corrective action, responding to inequalities in a 
way that promoted the welfare and wellbeing of others. 
Likewise, related research has demonstrated how awareness of inequality in past 
intergroup relations can promote adolescents’ support for corrective policies regarding 
opportunities. For example, Hughes and Bigler (2011) investigated 14-17 year-olds’ 
perceptions of a potential educational policy that could be implemented at their high 
school. In this study, adolescents heard about a proposed program that would provide all 
interested graduating African-American and Latino students, a historically under-
represented population, with free in-school assistance in completing college applications. 
Overall, adolescents were neutral to supportive of the policy. Support was greater among 
adolescents who knew more about historical racism, and for older adolescents support 
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was greater among those who perceived higher levels of racial disparities in society and 
attributed those disparities to racism.  
Thus, adolescents’ support for a program aimed at rectifying inequalities in access 
to opportunities was stronger among those who identified past disparities as wrong and 
discriminatory. More detail on related research examining children’s and adolescents’ 
social-cognitive capacity to detect discrimination and its role in children’s decisions 
about fair allocation is provided in the section ‘differential allocation as a form of 
discrimination’ (below). 
Further, recent research has emphasized that it is awareness of inequality in 
particular (not support for equality in general) that motivates adolescent’s decisions to 
engage in political action on behalf of marginalized groups. For example Diemer and 
Rapa (2016) examined relations between support for equality (e.g., “All ethnic and racial 
groups should have equal chances at jobs”), perceived inequality (e.g., “Children from 
poor families have fewer chances than others to get a good high school education”), and 
several forms of political action with a sample of low-income African-American and 
Latino 14-15 year-olds. While support for equality predicted few types of political 
behavior, perceiving a high level of inequality strongly predicted plans for political 
protest in the future (e.g., occupying public buildings, blocking traffic). Perceived 
inequality also predicted conventional forms of political action (e.g., joining a political 
party, writing to a representative) for African-American adolescents. 
This example highlights how perceiving inequality in society reflects some 
analysis and critique of systematic patterns, above and beyond a general belief that 
society ought to be more equal. Awareness of inequality also motivated adolescents to 
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work towards social change, revealing a link between awareness of inequality and 
support for fair relations between groups in the future.  
Together, the results of these three studies underscore the combined roles of 
moral reasoning and social awareness of inequality in predicting children’s and 
adolescents’ support for corrective allocation of resources and opportunities. These 
findings suggest that children must be aware of inequalities and evaluate them as wrong 
in order to respond with corrective action. Awareness of the existence of discrimination 
(in the past or present) is an important first step in determining how to respond to 
inequality of opportunity, but awareness alone is not enough (also see Diemer et al., 
2016). Moral judgments and reasoning support children’s capacity to critique disparities 
and determine fair ways of distributing resources and opportunities when they have the 
opportunity to do so. 
Unequal Access to Opportunities based on Group Membership 
Closely related research on children’s and adolescents’ judgments regarding the 
restriction of opportunities –especially educational opportunities– on the basis of group 
membership reveals similar concerns about discrimination and rights among older 
children and adolescents.  
Denial of opportunities based on group membership. For instance, one study 
found that 5-10 year-olds negatively judged a teacher’s decision to deny ethnic minority 
students the opportunity to be class leader or participate in a science fair, reasoning about 
such actions as preferential treatment and discrimination (Brown, 2006). Similarly, one 
study found that 6-10 year-olds negatively judged laws prohibiting the teaching of math 
to blue-eyed children, reasoning about the importance of obtaining knowledge (Helwig & 
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Jasiobedzka, 2001). Parallel to the research on children’s distribution of necessary 
resources (e.g., medical supplies) described above, findings from these studies reveal the 
emergence of more complex and abstract moral concerns, like the wrongfulness of 
restricting development, when children consider the implications of denying important 
opportunities on the basis of group membership.  
In intergroup contexts regarding the distribution of opportunities, in particular, 
concerns for discrimination emerge among older children and adolescents. For instance, 
one study found that 9-16 year-olds judged it wrong for a town to prohibit girls or ethnic 
minority children from going to school, reasoning about fairness issues including 
children’s rights to education (Killen et al., 2002), and another study found that 14-17 
year-olds judged it wrong to deny a student the opportunity to participate in a leadership 
trip or receive a scholarship on the basis of their membership in a stereotypically 
academically disengaged peer group, reasoning about moral issues including fairness, 
harm, and rights (Horn, 2003). 
Interestingly, one recent study drawing on the SRD model found that older 
children’s responses to an inequality of educational or medical resources between racial 
groups differed as a function of whether or not they perceived the inequality to be 
discriminatory. Elenbaas and Killen (2017) measured 10-11 year-olds’ spontaneous 
explanations for disparities of educational or medical resources between schools or 
hospitals serving African-American and European-American children. Participants most 
frequently explained disparities in terms of institutions’ differing financial resources, 
revealing their awareness that economic inequalities often underlie groups’ differential 
access to resources. Further, children attributed inequalities to preferential treatment more 
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often when they witnessed African-Americans at a disadvantage than when they 
witnessed European-Americans at a disadvantage, demonstrating awareness that racial 
minority groups are more likely than racial majority groups to experience restricted 
access to resources. Finally, children who reasoned about preferential treatment judged 
resource inequality, and actions that perpetuated inequality, more negatively than 
children who thought that disparities were based on institutions’ differing needs, 
revealing a link between awareness of discrimination and rejection of social inequalities. 
Thus, unequal access to resources and opportunities, especially those with long-
term implications for others’ wellbeing like educational and medical supplies, based on 
group membership is a salient issue invoking concerns for justice and rights among 
children and adolescents. These findings further emphasize how both social knowledge 
about inequality in intergroup relations and moral concerns about discrimination are 
important predictors of children’s support for fair allocation, in line with the parameters 
of the SRD model (Killen, Elenbaas, et al., 2015).  
Differential access as discrimination. Focusing on preferential allocation based 
on group membership as a type of discrimination raises the relevance of related work on 
children’s awareness of stereotypes and detection of other types of discrimination in 
everyday life. By the end of the elementary years, children are able to infer others’ 
stereotypes (McKown & Strambler, 2009; McKown & Weinstein, 2003), and are 
especially likely to identify differential treatment as group-relevant (e.g., racial or gender 
discrimination) if the perpetrator has an established history of biased behavior (Bigler, 
Arthur, Hughes, & Patterson, 2008; Brown, 2006; Brown & Bigler, 2004) or makes a 
decision that advantages an ingroup member rather than an outgroup member (Mills & 
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Grant, 2009). This social-cognitive ability to interpret behavior targeting a certain social 
group in terms of others’ biases has important implications for children’s responses to 
inequality of resources or opportunities (e.g., Elenbaas & Killen, 2017) 
For example, by 10-13 years of age, children are aware that, in many contexts, 
members of racial and ethnic minority groups are more likely to be the targets of 
discrimination than European-Americans (Brown, Mistry, & Bigler, 2007; Hughes, 2011; 
McKown & Strambler, 2009). Further, early adolescents draw progressively stronger 
connections between their own daily experiences and overarching societal biases against 
certain social groups. When evaluating the social exclusion of an African-American child 
from a group of European-American peers, for example, African-American adolescents 
reason about the wrongfulness of this action in the larger context of society by 
elaborating on the negative consequences of discrimination (Killen et al., 2002).  
Likewise, many adolescents (particularly adolescents of African-American and 
Latino background) report increasing personal experiences with discrimination from 
teachers, peers, and strangers, with reports ranging from wrongful discipline in school to 
being hassled by store clerks to teasing and online harassment (Fisher, Wallace, & 
Fenton, 2000; Rivas-Drake, Hughes, & Way, 2009; Umaña-Taylor, Tynes, Toomey, 
Williams, & Mitchell, 2015). While this review focuses on children’s judgments and 
decisions with regard to the allocation of resources and opportunities to others, it is 
notable that some work has examined relations between children’s own experiences of 
exclusion and discrimination and their decisions regarding social group inclusion and 
exclusion (an issue that is conceptually related to decisions regarding access to 
opportunities). Some research in this area has demonstrated that children who identify 
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highly with their cultural group and perceive that others view their group negatively are 
more exclusive in their friendship choices, perhaps as a result of rejection in everyday 
interactions (Cooley, Elenbaas, & Killen, 2016). 
This related research exemplifies how, particularly in late childhood and early 
adolescence, children’s own social experiences lead to the development of complex 
awareness of intergroup relations and histories, knowledge of which groups are typically 
the targets of exclusion from opportunities and resources, and understanding of 
connections between societal biases and their own everyday experiences. As mentioned 
above, awareness of discrimination is an essential first step for determining how to 
allocate resources and opportunities between groups in the future (Diemer & Rapa, 2016; 
Elenbaas & Killen, 2016b; Hughes & Bigler, 2011). This is because fairness does not 
always entail impartiality or disregard for group factors. In many cases, ensuring fair 
access requires intentional consideration of a past history of exclusion based on group 
membership. 
Group Norms and Children’s Allocation Decisions 
As reviewed thus far, children must balance moral concerns for others’ welfare 
with social group expectations when allocating resources and opportunities in intergroup 
contexts (Killen, Elenbaas, et al., 2015). Children’s awareness of norms and expectations 
around the distribution of resources and opportunities, and particularly intergroup 
allocation norms, contribute to their own allocation decisions (Abrams et al., 2015; 
McGuire et al., 2015; Sierksma, Thijs, & Verkuyten, 2014). For example, 4-5 year-olds 
who hear that their peers have been “selfish” give fewer pieces of candy to a partner 
(McAuliffe, Raihani, & Dunham, 2017), and young children’s preferential giving to 
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ingroup members is related to the extent to which they expect ingroup members to 
behave prosocially towards them (Dunham et al., 2011; Renno & Shutts, 2015). In the 
opposite sense, exposure to an anti-discrimination norm can lead 9-10 year-olds to 
allocate more money to an out-group member (Monteiro et al., 2009). Thus, children’s 
perceptions of the distribution norms that groups hold can impact their own decisions 
about how to allocate resources. 
Group and individual perspectives on fairness. At the same time, older 
children are able to recognize that groups’ perspectives on resource distribution may 
differ from their own (Abrams & Rutland, 2008). Older children and adolescents define 
groups and group identity in terms of a set of shared attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors 
(Abrams et al., 2003, 2009), and expect individuals to endorse these shared norms in 
order to sustain their group membership (Abrams et al., 2008). Children’s developing 
understanding that social groups may hold a different perspective from their own 
personal view is related to their increasing social experience with an ever-widening range 
of social groups (Abrams et al., 2009; Jugert et al., 2011) and increasing capacity for 
social perspective taking (Abrams et al., 2009, 2015; FitzRoy & Rutland, 2010; Jugert et 
al., 2011; Nesdale, 2013). 
Groups may, for instance, advocate for more resources for their group, while 
children themselves would prefer equality. Children are aware of this distinction from 
fairly early in development (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Mulvey et al., 2014). As one 
example, drawing on the SRD model, Cooley and Killen (2015) found that 5-6 year-olds 
expected an advantaged group that traditionally received more resources to be less 
approving of an individual member advocating for equal distribution between groups 
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than would 3-4 year-olds. Likewise, 5-6 year-olds personally evaluated this advocate for 
equality positively, but recognized that an advantaged group would not like an individual 
seeking to change the norm. These same differential evaluations were also found in older 
children’s expectations about an after-school club’s opinion of an individual who 
advocated for equal allocation of money between clubs when the usual approach was to 
seek more for the ingroup (Killen, Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey, & Hitti, 2013; Mulvey et 
al., 2014). In these studies, adolescents justified their evaluations of the group’s reaction 
with references to issues of group functioning (e.g., “The group would like her because 
she’s trying to get more money for them”), demonstrating their increasing awareness of 
group processes and pressures.  
Thus, between early childhood and adolescence, children build their capacity to 
distinguish what is fair from what is expected. Children’s expectations for how groups 
will react to members who want to change established allocation norms shed light on the 
origins of knowledge about group dynamics (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Mulvey et al., 
2014). They do not, however, answer the question of what children expect group 
allocation norms to be in the first place. Determining what children believe these norms 
to be has the potential to reveal important information about their developing knowledge 
concerning how inequalities are exacerbated (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016c). 
Few studies, however, have investigated the actual allocation norms that children 
expect groups to hold. The next section will outline what is known about children’s 
expectations for how others would allocate resources and opportunities, and accent the 
need for more research in this area. Studies on children’s expectations for how others 
would allocate provide information about developing conceptions of how resources and 
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opportunities can and should move through social systems (Arsenio et al., 2013; Wainryb 
& Recchia, 2014). 
Perceptions of allocation norms. Some evidence has emerged to suggest that 
children begin to expect others to share preferentially with ingroup members in early 
childhood. For example, one study found that 5 year-olds (but not 3 year-olds) expected a 
protagonist to share equally with their friends approximately 90% of the time, but only 
expected equal sharing with disliked peers approximately 40% of the time (Paulus & 
Moore, 2014). Likewise, one study found that, between 4 and 10 years of age, children 
increasingly expected members of school groups in competition to allocate more cookies 
to their ingroup rather than dividing equally (from 40% of 4 year-olds to 80% of 8 year-
olds) (DeJesus, Rhodes, & Kinzler, 2014).  
Related work has also shown that 6-10 year-olds (but not 3-5 year-olds) expect 
individuals from a minimal group to help members of their own group more than 
members of another group (Rhodes, 2012), and 5-13 year-olds predict that others would 
feel better helping racial and gender ingroup peers in need, and happier ignoring the 
needs of racial and gender outgroup peers (Weller & Lagattuta, 2013, 2014). Together 
these findings suggest that, soon after children begin to distribute resources preferentially 
to their own ingroup members, they begin to expect others to do the same. 
By contrast, when there are no group-based differences between allocator and 
recipients (e.g., in same-group contexts), some studies indicate that children anticipate 
equal distribution norms to take precedence. For instance, 3-8 year-olds expect pennies to 
be shared equally between two recipients after they collaborated to earn them (Ng et al., 
2011), and expect strangers to share stickers equally with them (Smith, Blake, & Harris, 
63 
 
2013). This indicates that expectations for equality, in addition to expectations for 
ingroup biased preferential allocation, are also present from early in development. In fact, 
research on resource allocation in the first years of life indicates that infants may expect 
adults to allocate equally to third parties before they even have the motor skills to enact 
such equal allocations themselves (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Sloane et al., 2012; 
Sommerville et al., 2013). 
These findings reveal a coexistence of expectations for equality and expectations 
for ingroup preference in young children’s perceptions of the allocation norms that others 
hold. In fact, these expectations emerge quite early in development, parallel to children’s 
own use of equal allocation strategies in within-group contexts and demonstration of 
ingroup biases in between-group allocation decisions (see the preceding sections for 
details). Yet, as this is a relatively new area of research, many questions remain open for 
investigation.  
Group status and competing expectations. One relevant question is whether 
children expect others to allocate resources differently depending on the status of their 
group (well-resourced or under-resourced). For example, in a recent study drawing on the 
SRD model, Elenbaas and colleagues (2016c) found that, in a context of resource 
inequality between groups, 3-6 year-olds’ expectations for others’ allocation decisions 
hinged on their expectations for how others would judge the inequality. Specifically, 
children expected a member of an under-resourced group to reduce the inequality 
between groups when that person evaluated the inequality negatively, and a member of a 
well-resourced group to increase the disparity when that person evaluated the inequality 
positively. Surprisingly, this study revealed only one set of circumstances in which young 
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children expected another individual to reduce a resource inequality between groups (the 
member of the under-resourced group who evaluated the inequality negatively). The 
well-resourced group member, however, was frequently expected to adhere to allocation 
norms that sustained the inequality between groups.  
Children’s expectations for how others would allocate resources or opportunities 
may also reflect stereotypes about the behavior of well-resourced and under-resourced 
groups. As discussed in more detail below, whether or not children equate resource 
inequality (how many units of a given resource an individual possesses) with economic 
inequality (how much wealth or income an individual possesses) is yet unknown. 
However, children’s stereotypes about high-wealth and low-wealth peers may be relevant 
to their expectations for the behavior of well-resourced and under-resourced groups in a 
context of limited resources.  
Specifically, children hold stereotypes that low-wealth peers are not hardworking 
or intelligent and that high-wealth peers have these qualities (Mistry et al., 2015; Shutts et 
al., 2016; Sigelman, 2012; Woods et al., 2005). Essentially, children, like adults, tend to 
assume that affluence is earned, and poverty is the result of a lack of effort or 
responsibility. Yet, when the question pertains to how to distribute resources, rather than 
how one obtained ones resources, other stereotypes may apply. Besides being perceived 
as competent (i.e., hardworking and intelligent), adults perceive the wealthy as less warm 
(i.e., more competitive) (Cuddy et al., 2007; Fiske et al., 2002). Children, too, may view 




However, one recent study found that 6 and 10-year-olds viewed “rich people” as 
both smarter and nicer than “poor people” (Roussos & Dunham, 2016). That is, unlike 
adults, children had difficulty entertaining the notion of a highly competent group that 
was not also high in warmth. These findings suggest the opposite possibility, that 
children may expect high-wealth peers to be more generous than low-wealth peers when 
deciding how resources should be distributed. 
Taken together, the studies discussed in the preceding section strongly suggest 
that, between early and middle childhood, children increasingly expect preferential 
allocation to ingroups as a general normative behavior in intergroup contexts. The studies 
outlined in this section further indicate that they may perceive different norms for under-
resourced groups (reducing inequality) and well-resourced groups (maintaining 
advantaged position). One implication is that this recognition may have a detrimental 
impact on children’s own motivation to correct disparities. Given that inequality in many 
societies around the world has increased steadily in recent years (Isaacs, Sawhill, & 
Haskins, 2008), further research on children’s perceptions of how resources are allocated, 
as well as judgments regarding how they should be allocated, is needed in order to 
understand developing notions of how group status relates to  power and control over 
resources and opportunities. 
Economic Status and Allocation Decisions 
Following on this point, economic disparities are a central form of resource and 
opportunity inequality between individuals and groups. Reflecting the focus of research 
in this area to date, the studies reviewed in the preceding sections have primarily focused 
on children’s distribution decisions in intergroup contexts based on race or gender. Less 
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is known regarding children’s conceptions of fair allocation when groups differ in wealth. 
Economic disparities are, however, a primary form of inequality. That is, while 
inequalities in access to opportunities and resources often map on to other group 
categories like race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, (dis)ability, religion, and 
immigrant status, economic inequalities are a form that underlies or reinforces inequality 
in most other group-based domains (Carter & Reardon, 2014; Saegert et al., 2007). Thus, 
they are of great importance when considering how resources and opportunities are, and 
should be, distributed. 
This section argues that, despite receiving little attention in the distributive justice 
literature to date, economic status is a highly relevant type of group membership for 
investigation with regard to children’s allocation decisions. Like other intergroup 
contexts, allocation to individuals or groups that vary in wealth may invoke intergroup 
biases for children (i.e., preferential allocation to the ingroup), but it is very likely that 
this context would also invoke strong moral concerns for others’ welfare and needs (e.g., 
Ongley et al., 2014; Shutts et al., 2016) as well as strong assumptions about entitlement 
(e.g., Sigelman, 2012; Woods et al., 2005) that are less readily assessed in other 
intergroup contexts. 
Recognizing associations between economic status and opportunities. 
Economic status is a salient and relevant social consideration in children’s everyday lives 
and peer interactions, beginning at least in the early elementary years. From as young as 
5 years of age, children identify individuals as “rich” or “poor” based on their clothing 
and possessions (Enesco & Navarro, 2003; Ramsey, 1991; Shutts et al., 2016). During the 
early elementary years, children also reference material possessions (e.g., houses, cars) 
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when distinguishing between wealth and poverty (Chafel & Neitzel, 2005). Thus, from an 
early age, children have a basic awareness that greater wealth is associated with 
possession of more or better resources.  
In late childhood, children also begin to recognize the connection between 
economic status and access to opportunities (in addition to resources). By 8-10 years of 
age, for instance, children note that some peers participate in after-school clubs or travel 
to summer camps or vacation destinations while others do not, and that this varies by 
family economic status (Mistry et al., 2015; White, 2009). Older children may also be 
aware that their lower-income peers are sometimes passed up for classroom 
opportunities, as observational studies indicate that middle-SES students request and 
receive help from teachers more frequently than their lower-SES peers (Calarco, 2011; 
Streib, 2011). 
In early adolescence, economic status becomes an increasingly relevant factor in 
children’s daily social interactions. Older children and adolescents are able to identify 
their own families’ economic status relative to other families in their neighborhood or 
school (Adler et al., 2000; Goodman et al., 2001; Goodman, Huang, Schafer-Kalkhoff, & 
Adler, 2007; Goodman et al., 2015; Mistry et al., 2015; Singh-Manoux, Marmot, & 
Adler, 2005), and both high-SES and low-SES adolescents report having more same-SES 
than cross-SES acquaintances, friends, and close friends (Crosnoe & Schneider, 2010; 
Grewal, 2013), and preferring to befriend peers of the same SES (Weinger, 2000). 
Further, many adolescents report having been teased about their family’s financial 
situation; in one study, 17-23% of low-SES 10-14% of middle-SES and 5-18% of high-
SES middle and high school students reported experiencing this type of teasing 
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(Bucchianeri et al., 2013). By adulthood, many Americans live in economically 
segregated communities (Reardon & Bischoff, 2011).  
In addition to increased attention to economic status in social life, older 
adolescents demonstrate greater awareness of the role of education (an important 
opportunity) in determining wealth and income in adulthood (Goodman et al., 2000). 
Leahy’s early studies in this area first demonstrated increases between early childhood 
and late adolescence in awareness of the impact of social factors, such as lack of jobs and 
training, on poverty (Leahy, 1981, 1983), and subsequent work provides converging 
evidence that, between 12 and 18 years of age, adolescents are increasingly likely to 
explain poverty in terms of societal causes including lack of job or educational 
opportunities (Arsenio et al., 2013; Flanagan et al., 2014). 
Together these findings point to the relevance of economic status in children’s 
and adolescents’ everyday lives, and pinpoint late childhood and early adolescence as a 
time when awareness of the links between economic status and access to resources and 
opportunities increases. This growing awareness may have a positive or a negative 
impact on children’s allocation decisions in intergroup contexts. However, research on 
allocation decisions and recipient economic status is scarce. The next part of this section 
will draw on related research to suggest two primary possibilities regarding the impact of 
recipient economic status on children’s distribution decisions.  
System-justifying beliefs. Research has revealed that adults often rationalize or 
legitimize existing social arrangements, fulfilling a psychological need to understand the 
status quo as good, fair, natural, desirable, and inevitable (Jost & Banaji, 1994). 
Accordingly, adults often find ways of psychologically justifying and maintaining 
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economic disparities between groups (Jost et al., 2004). Some research suggests that 
children, too, perceive certain group-based resource inequalities to be deserved, and 
assume that the way things are is the way that they are supposed to be (Horwitz et al., 
2014; McGillicuddy-De Lisi et al., 2006; Olson et al., 2011). 
For example, Olson and colleagues (2011) investigated children’s resource 
allocation decisions when groups had a history of advantage or disadvantage. In this 
study, 3-11 year-olds witnessed a series of unequal allocations of cookies between 
recipients representing different racial or novel groups. Then participants were shown a 
new set of representative recipients, given three cookies, and asked to give each child 
“what he deserves”. Children most often adhered to the established norm by giving more 
cookies to the target from the advantaged group. Olson and colleagues interpreted 
children’s allocation decisions as evidence of their endorsement of the unequal status 
quo, in line with system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994). 
Further, adults often hold negative assumptions about individuals in poverty as 
lazy, unintelligent, and lacking in self-control (Cuddy et al., 2007; Lott, 2012; Saegert et 
al., 2007). These explanations for economic inequality place the focus on the individual. 
Attaining a high income, for example, is inferred to be the result of hard work and 
intelligence alone. Children and adolescents, too, make assumptions about income and 
individual merit or deservedness. Leahy’s early work in this area documented a greater 
emphasis on intelligence, education, and effort among children aged 11 and older, as well 
as a greater tendency to justify economic inequality on the basis of these attributions 
(Leahy, 1981, 1983). Likewise more recent research has found that 10-12 year-olds 
endorse more positive attributes (e.g., smart, hardworking) about the rich and the middle 
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class than about the poor, and more negative attributes (e.g., dumb, lazy) about the poor 
than about the middle class or the rich (Mistry et al., 2015). 6-14 year-olds have also been 
found to hold stereotypes about poverty and lack of intelligence or lack of academic 
ability (Roussos & Dunham, 2016; Shutts et al., 2016; Sigelman, 2012; Woods et al., 
2005). 
Thus, older children and adolescents are aware that greater wealth affords greater 
access to many important resources and opportunities. However, one possibility is that 
children view economic inequality as the “natural” result of individual differences in 
effort or intelligence, infer that such inequality is justified, and that they would be 
justified in perpetuating it by directing more resources and opportunities toward 
deserving advantaged groups. 
System-critiquing beliefs. Conversely, if children view economic inequality as 
the unjust result of social processes, their interest in directing more resources or 
opportunities towards disadvantaged groups is likely to be high. As outlined above, older 
children demonstrate some awareness of the role of access to opportunities in 
determining wealth and income later in life (e.g., Arsenio et al., 2013; Flanagan et al., 
2014). Older children and adolescents are able to explain poverty in terms of societal 
causes including lack of educational and job opportunities (Flanagan et al., 2014; 
Goodman et al., 2000), and one study even found that adolescents frequently mention 
extra opportunities (e.g., SAT prep courses) as examples of how economic inequality is 
unfair (Arsenio et al., 2013). 
Additionally, several studies indicate that children and adolescents judge the 
denial of resources and opportunities on the basis of other types of group membership 
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negatively (e.g., Brown, 2006; Elenbaas et al., 2016). These attributions for inequality 
place the focus on social or societal contributors. Having a low income, for example, is 
attributed to situational constraints like lack of job opportunities or access to education, 
rather than individual failings like laziness or lack of academic ability. 
Thus, a second possibility is that older children may reason that inequality of 
resources or opportunities based on economic status is unfair, and that groups with less 
access in the past should receive increased or equal access in the present. Further 
supporting this possibility, research in social domain theory indicates that individuals 
evaluate, critique, and sometimes try to change norms that they judge to be unfair (Turiel, 
2014; Wainryb & Recchia, 2014). When allocating resources, for example, older children 
take inequality into account, distributing more to an individual with fewer resources 
(Kienbaum & Wilkening, 2009; Rizzo & Killen, 2016). 
However, whether or not resource inequality (how many units of a given resource 
a recipient already possesses) can be equated with economic inequality (how much 
wealth or income a recipient possesses) is yet unknown. Interestingly, early research in 
the area of resource allocation typically asked children to divide up small sums of money 
between peers who worked hard (i.e., a merit-based claim) and peers who were depicted 
as poor (i.e., a poverty-based claim) (Damon, 1975, 1980; Enright et al., 1984). More 
recent work has revealed that 5-6 year-olds allocate resources approximately equally 
between recipients in such situations, while 9-10 and 13-14 year-olds recognize the 
relevance of both merit and poverty, favoring the poor recipient specifically in contexts 




Very little research, however, has examined economic status as a central claim to 
resources (rather than in contrast with other claims, including merit). Three exceptions 
include an older investigation by Zinser and colleagues and two recent studies, one by 
Ongley and colleagues and one by Shutts and colleagues. Ongley and colleagues (2014) 
found that, even when they could keep all of their stickers for themselves, 8 year-olds 
donated more stickers to “poor children” (pictured as economically disadvantaged) than 
did 4 year-olds (8 year-olds donated over half of their stickers whereas 4 year-olds 
donated less than a third). Interestingly, children in this study who used moral reasoning 
when explaining how another child would feel when denied a resource (cupcake) or 
opportunity (to learn a song) also donated more stickers to poor children. Further, Shutts 
and colleagues (2016) found that, even though 5-9 year-olds reported a preference for 
befriending a hypothetical peer described as living with ample finances, they distributed 
more toys to a hypothetical peer described as living with limited finances (in a vignette 
including references to resources, lifestyle, and family purchasing power). Interestingly 
Zinser and colleagues (1976; 1975) found that even 4-6 year-olds shared more candy 
with a low-wealth peer than a high-wealth peer in a context designed to invoke concerns 
for charity. 
Building on the research reviewed above indicating that, by the elementary years, 
children are aware of the relation between economic status and access to resources and 
opportunities, these studies suggest that, when allocating resources between recipients 
who differ in wealth, children seek to correct inequalities in a broad sense, distributing 
more items to low-wealth recipients (Ongley et al., 2014; Shutts et al., 2016; Sigelman & 
Waitzman, 1991; Zinser & Lydiatt, 1976; Zinser et al., 1975). Notably, these findings 
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coincide with research drawing on the SRD model indicating that older children are able 
to use their knowledge of intergroup relations to take action to reduce inequality 
(Elenbaas & Killen, 2016b, 2017). That is, when they make distribution decisions that 
bear on familiar inequalities in society, children do not necessarily replicate what they 
have observed. Rather, they often take advantage of the chance to equalize access.  
Impact of child economic status on allocation decisions. A natural question 
following from the research described is whether children’s allocation decisions to 
individuals of low- or high-economic status might also differ by participant’s own 
economic status. Considerable important research has examined the effects of child or 
family socioeconomic status on numerous developmental outcomes (Duncan et al., 2015; 
McLoyd et al., 2014). However, based on the literature to date, it is difficult to formulate 
a directional prediction regarding how children’s own economic status might impact their 
judgments about how access to opportunities should be allocated.  
Most work in this area has focused on SES and children’s donation behaviors. For 
instance, some research indicates that lower-income 3-5 year-olds donate more tokens to 
a “sick kid” (Miller, Kahle, & Hastings, 2015) while other research indicates that higher-
SES 4-9 year olds donate more stickers to an anonymous peer (Benenson, Pascoe, & 
Radmore, 2007) and higher-income 5-9 year-olds are more likely to allocate toys to a 
low-wealth peer than a high-wealth peer (Shutts et al., 2016). Still other research 
indicates no differences in the number of stickers that 4-8 year-olds’ donate to low-
wealth peers by their parents’ level of education (Ongley et al., 2014) and no differences 
in the proportion of stickers that 5-11 year-olds donate to another kid “just like them” as a 
function of the number of stickers available to donate (Posid, Fazio, & Cordes, 2015). 
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These contradictory findings do not resolve in adolescence (Carlo, Padilla-Walker, & 
Day, 2011). Thus, the exact role of children’s own economic status on their decisions 
about how resources or opportunities should be distributed remains an open question.  
One possibility is that higher-income children and adolescents may be more likely 
than their lower-income peers to judge that other high-income children should receive 
access to opportunities. In general, higher-income adults are often more independent and 
self-focused whereas lower-income adults are often more interdependent and other-
focused (Kraus et al., 2009; Piff et al., 2010; Stephens et al., 2007). These tendencies 
have been attributed to differences in the amount of control and personal choice that 
individuals with more or fewer resources experience in their lives (Kraus et al., 2012). In 
fact, there is some evidence that many higher-income adults simply feel more entitled and 
deserving (in general) than others (Piff, 2014). More specifically, higher-income adults 
are less generous in donation contexts (Piff et al., 2010), less egalitarian in sharing 
contexts (Bratanova et al., 2016), and more likely to take resources from one person to 
benefit several others (Côté et al., 2013).  
These findings suggest that higher-income children and adolescents, too, may be 
especially likely to believe that other high-income peers are entitled to opportunities. 
However, notably, differences in the generosity of lower- versus higher-income adults 
may only emerge in societies with a high level of economic inequality, or a high level of 
perceived inequality (Côté et al., 2015). This further highlights the relevance of 
children’s perceptions of inequality in society for their judgments about how 
opportunities should be distributed. 
75 
 
Another complementary possibility is that lower-income children and adolescents 
may be more aware of economic inequalities than their higher-income peers, and thus 
more likely to judge that other low-income children should receive access to 
opportunities. In regards to educational opportunities in particular, low-income older 
adolescents are conscious of potential barriers to their educational achievement, and some 
report lower educational expectations that their higher-income peers (Arsenio et al., 
2013; Diemer & Li, 2012; McWhirter & McWhirter, 2015; Taylor & Graham, 2007). 
Likewise, stress related to family financial constraints contributes negatively to academic 
achievement, school engagement, and attitudes about education in adolescence (Benner 
& Wang, 2014; Crosnoe, 2009; Mistry et al., 2009).  
However, low-income older adolescents and young adults who actively discuss 
current political and social issues with their peers and parents report a higher level of 
agency for addressing problems in their communities, including social inequality 
(Diemer, 2012; Diemer & Li, 2011; Watts & Flanagan, 2007). Further, in adulthood, low-
income individuals are more likely to reference barriers to opportunities (e.g., 
discrimination, political influence) when describing the causes of wealth and poverty 
(Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Kraus et al., 2009). These findings suggest that lower-income 
children may be more aware of economic disparities than their higher-income peers. 
Whether or not this means that they would also make different moral judgments about 
fair access to educational opportunities, however, remains untested. 
A third possibility is that children may provide more opportunities for peers from 
their own wealth background, particularly when they perceive an unmet need. Over and 
above ingroup bias in allocation decisions, children and adolescents are more attuned to 
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the needs of members of their social ingroups than members of social outgroups (Abrams 
et al., 2015; Sierksma et al., 2015; Weller & Lagattuta, 2013, 2014). For instance, 5-10 
year-olds are more likely to help, share with, and comfort a minimal ingroup member 
than a minimal outgroup member (Abrams et al., 2015), and 8-13 year-olds help a friend 
in need more than a stranger in the same circumstances (Sierksma et al., 2015). This 
suggests that, rather than an across-the-board support for or rejection of economic 
inequalities in access to opportunities, children’s decisions may be moderated by their 
perceptions that someone at least somewhat similar to them has been denied an 
opportunity in the past, entitling them to greater access in the present. 
Research in social psychology includes a long history of important findings 
regarding adults’ endorsement of economic inequality as fair, largely based in 
meritocratic assumptions about the functioning of society (Jost et al., 2004; Lott, 2012). 
The findings reviewed above do not preclude the possibility that children, too, might 
endorse these assumptions and distribute resources and opportunities accordingly. 
However, the possibility remains that, in a context of economic inequality, knowledge of 
recipients’ group membership (i.e., taking wealth status into account) may promote fair 
allocation decisions rather than perpetuation of the status quo. In fact, children must 
recognize that some groups have been unfairly disadvantaged in the past and use that 
information in order to determine the fairest way to distribute resources in the present.  
The Current Study 
 Many questions in social life revolve around who will or will not receive access to 
resources and opportunities. This review has outlined theory and research on children’s 
allocation decisions, focusing on how children balance social concerns for group identity 
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and group dynamics with moral concerns for fair treatment in these contexts (Killen et 
al., 2016; Killen, Elenbaas, et al., 2015). As well, this review has provided a background 
on the study of distributive justice in childhood, outlining key findings from the literature 
on moral development and highlighting research at the intersection of moral development 
and intergroup relations. 
Throughout this review it has been argued that, although research on children’s 
decisions regarding the allocation of resources has provided valuable information about 
the development of concern for equity and justice, children’s decisions regarding the 
allocation of opportunities are an equally important topic for investigation. Building on 
the theoretical foundation of the SRD model (Killen, Elenbaas, et al., 2015), this study 
was the first to examine children’s and adolescents’ judgments regarding the allocation of 
opportunities to peers. 
Access to opportunities constitute a meaningful fairness issue in children’s 
everyday lives (e.g., Brown, 2006; Mistry et al., 2015), and the denial of opportunities 
invokes complex moral concerns for children that are not as often observed in contexts 
where tangible resources are being distributed, such as concerns for discrimination and 
rights (e.g., Horn, 2003; Hughes & Bigler, 2011). These more abstract moral concepts 
reflect children’s consideration of the long-term impact of unfairly restricting access to 
opportunities. Thus, this study provided important evidence for how children reason that 
such opportunities should be allocated. 
Further, older children make different resource allocation decisions depending on 
the implications of inequality for recipients (e.g., Rizzo et al., 2016). That is, children are 
able to moderate their allocation decisions depending on the type of resource available 
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for allocation, considering multiple moral issues, including others’ welfare in addition to 
fairness and equality. Along these same lines, this study examined children’s decisions 
with regard to the distribution of educational opportunities, in order to understand the 
development of multiple overlapping moral concerns when children make allocation 
decisions. 
Importantly, allocation decisions in intergroup contexts involve additional social 
considerations, beyond those moral concerns invoked in within-group distributive 
contexts (Killen et al., 2016). While considerable research at the intersection of allocation 
and intergroup attitudes has focused on the negative aspects of intergroup attitudes (e.g., 
ingroup bias, prejudice), in some cases, awareness or knowledge about intergroup 
relations can contribute to, rather than impede, the promotion of fairness in childhood 
(e.g., Diemer & Rapa, 2016; Elenbaas & Killen, 2016b). This is a complex issue. 
Understanding the origins of behavior that challenges the legitimacy of inequalities 
between groups, in particular, is essential to creating a more just society. The novel focus 
of this study on allocation of educational opportunities in an intergroup context 
demonstrated older children and adolescents’ recognition that, in a context of inequality 
fairness requires more than impartiality. Rather, ensuring fair access to opportunities 
requires consideration of a past history of exclusion based on economic status. 
Similarly, this review emphasized the need for more research on children’s 
awareness of the allocation norms that groups hold. Norms and expectations around the 
distribution of resources and opportunities, once established, are strong predictors of 
children’s allocation decisions (e.g., Abrams et al., 2015; McGuire et al., 2015; Sierksma, 
Thijs, & Verkuyten, 2014), but few studies have investigated the actual allocation norms 
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that children expect groups to adhere to. This study extended previous work at the 
intersection of resource allocation and developmental subjective group dynamics by 
identifying the allocation norms that children expect others (and other groups) to hold. 
Children’s knowledge of, and expectations surrounding, allocation, particularly in 
intergroup contexts, reveal their developing awareness of how social systems currently 
function (i.e., how, when, and by whom resources and opportunities are distributed) as 
well as how they should function (Elenbaas & Killen, 2016c). 
Finally, despite receiving little attention in the distributive justice literature to 
date, economic status is a highly relevant type of group membership for investigation 
with regard to children’s intergroup allocation decisions. Drawing on the SRD model 
(Killen, Elenbaas, et al., 2015), this study provided evidence for how children weigh past 
distributive norms with moral reasoning about fairness when deciding how best to 
address everyday issues of unequal access to opportunities based on economic status. 
Economic status is a salient type of group membership in children’s everyday lives 
(Mistry et al., 2015). Importantly, economic status is closely related to actual access to 
resources and opportunities in childhood and adulthood, and older children recognize this 
connection (Chafel & Neitzel, 2005; Flanagan et al., 2014). Like other intergroup 
contexts, allocation to individuals or groups that vary in wealth invoke intergroup biases 
for children, but it also invoke strong concerns for inequality and need that are less 
readily assessed in other intergroup contexts (Ongley et al., 2014; Shutts et al., 2016). 
This study examined the role of recipient and participant economic status in children’s 
decisions about how to fairly distribute opportunities and their expectations for the 
decisions that others would make in the same context. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
The central aims of this study pertain to children’s judgments, reasoning, and 
expectations in response to an inequality of opportunity based on economic status. This 
chapter describes the design and measures, including central questions and response 
options. Please see Appendix C (Protocol) for copies of the instrument (survey) 
containing details on the exact stimuli and text that participants viewed. 
Participants 
 The sample included N = 342 children ages 8 – 14 years old (M = 11.63 years, SD 
= 1.87 years) attending third through eighth grade racially/ethnically diverse majority 
middle-income schools in the suburbs of a large city in the mid-Atlantic United States. Of 
these 342 participants, 50% (n = 171) evaluated a context in which high-wealth peers had 
been excluded from an opportunity in the past and 50% (n = 171) evaluated a context in 
which low-wealth peers had been excluded from the same opportunity.  
Participants were approximately evenly distributed across the six grade levels: 
19% (n = 67) 3rd graders, 15% (n = 52) 4th graders, 15% (n = 50) 5th graders, 17% (n = 
60) 6th graders, 16% (n = 55) 7th graders, 17% (n = 58) 8th graders. Participant gender, 
race and/or ethnicity, and approximate annual family income was obtained by parent 
report. Gender for the sample was 50% (n = 171) boys and 50% (n = 171) girls. Race 
and/or ethnicity for the sample was 43% (n = 147) European-American, 22% (n = 75) 
African-American, 7% (n = 25) Asian-American, 8% (n = 28) Latino/a (not in 
combination with any other racial group), 13% (n = 45) multiracial/multiethnic, and 6% 
(n = 22) declined to provide race/ethnicity information. Approximate annual family 
income for the sample was 1% (n = 3) <30K, 8% (n = 28) $30K-60K, 6% (n = 22) $60-
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90K, 13% (n = 44) $90K-120K, 10% (n = 35) $120K-150K, 12% (n = 41) $150K-180K, 
27% (n = 94) >$180K, and 22% (n = 75) declined to provide family income information. 
Participant gender and racial/ethnic demographics closely matched those of the general 
population under 18 years of age in the area of the country where data were collected. 
Notably, relative to the rest of the United States, the area where data were collected has a 
high median annual household income ($98,704) (US Census Bureau QuickFacts, 2015). 
Assignment to condition did not differ significantly as a function of participant 
Grade (χ2(5, N = 342) = .45, p = .99), Gender (χ2(1, N = 342) = .57, p = .45), 
Race/Ethnicity (χ2(445, N = 320) = 3.37, p = .50), or Family Income (χ2(6, N = 267) = 
1.97, p = .92). Please see Table 1 (in the Tables section) for exact details on condition 
assignment by grade and family income. 
Recruitment. Participants were recruited via contact with elementary and middle 
schools in the suburbs of a large city in the mid-Atlantic United States. First, school 
principals were contacted with information about the study and an invitation to 
participate. For interested schools, a Research Coordinator made all necessary 
arrangements regarding consent form distribution and study participation with the 
principal or another designated school representative. Written parental informed consent 
and children’s verbal assent were obtained for all participants. 
Design 
This study entailed a between-subjects and within-subjects design. As displayed 
in Table 2 (in the Tables section), all participants completed three tasks (within-subjects): 
the Opportunity Allocation Task, the Allocation Norms Task, and the Inequality 
Perceptions Task. This study used an experimental vignette survey methodology 
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successfully applied in previous studies on children’s decisions about resource allocation 
(see Killen et al., 2016 for a review). The entire survey (both versions) is available in 
Appendix C (Protocol). 
Economic Inequality Condition was the between-subjects factor. Economic 
Inequality Condition referred to which economic group (high or low) participants saw 
being excluded from access to the opportunity in the past. Specifically, in one version of 
the protocol (randomized between participants) peers from families with “a little money” 
had not benefitted from the opportunity in the past, and in the other version peers from 
families with “a lot of money” had not benefitted from the opportunity in the past.  
All other factors were within-subjects (as listed in Table 2). In the Opportunity 
Allocation Task, participants read about a special opportunity, described as both fun and 
educational, to which access has been restricted in the past based on wealth status. Then, 
participants learned that there was limited availability for the opportunity at present, and 
that equal numbers of children from both wealth backgrounds were interested in gaining 
access. Following this, participants made a series of judgments and decisions regarding 
possible ways to determine who should gain access to this opportunity. 
In the Allocation Norms Task, participants gave their expectations for how the 
two groups (high-wealth and low-wealth group) would prefer the opportunities to be 
allocated. Options included those represented in the previous task. In the Economic 
Knowledge Task, participants reported their awareness of broader relations between 




All components of the vignettes included in the paper survey forms were 
illustrated with relevant photos and drawings. The entire survey (both versions) is 
available in Appendix C (Protocol). Participants completed all measures independently, 
in a communal space at their school (e.g., library), in the company of peers from their 
grade level (seated far enough away to protect confidentiality) and supervised by trained 
Research Assistants. The entire survey session took approximately 20 minutes. During 
the assent process, participants were told that this was not a test, there were no “right or 
wrong” answers, they could skip questions they did not want to answer or stop 
participating at any time, and that their responses were confidential and anonymous. 
After their survey session, before returning to their classroom, each participant spoke to a 
Research Assistant who asked what they thought of the study and if they had any 
questions. Though these conversations were not recorded, participants were generally 
neutral to positive about their experience. 
Measures 
 Participants completed three tasks, as introduced above and summarized in Table 
2. The questions included in the Opportunity Allocation Task were developed based on 
previous research in moral development examining children’s resource allocation 
decisions (e.g., Elenbaas & Killen, 2016b; Grocke et al., 2015; Olson et al., 2011). The 
questions included in the Allocation Norms Task were developed based on previous 
research in developmental subjective group dynamics examining children’s expectations 
for groups’ responses to deviance from allocation norms (e.g., Cooley & Killen, 2015; 
Elenbaas & Killen, 2016c; Mulvey et al., 2014). The questions included in the Inequality 
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Perceptions Task were developed based on previous research investigating children’s 
attributions for economic inequality (e.g., Flanagan et al., 2014; Mistry et al., 2015; 
Sigelman, 2012). The following sections include descriptions of each task.  
 Experimental conditions. First, participants were introduced to the groups of 
high-wealth and low-wealth peers, and the educational summer camp opportunity: “Here 
are some kids who all live in the same city. Some of these kids’ families have a lot of 
money. They live in houses like this and ride in cars like this. And some of these kids’ 
families have a little money. They live in houses like this and ride in cars like this.” 
Images of children were silhouette outlines pre-tested to reveal no implications about 
race/ethnicity. There were 10 children in each group. Images of houses and cars are 
frequently used to depict wealth/income groups, and children spontaneously refer to these 
items when describing high-wealth and low-wealth peers (e.g., Chafel & Neitzel, 2005; 
Flanagan et al., 2014; Sigelman, 2012). The images used in this study were taken from a 
previous measure testing children’s perceptions of economic status (Elenbaas & Killen, 
2016b). 
Next, the opportunity was introduced: “In this city, there is a zoo. Every summer 
the zoo organizes a special Zoo Summer Camp! Kids can go to Zoo Summer Camp for a 
whole week for free. Zoo Summer Camp is a special opportunity. It is really fun, and it is 
also a really important opportunity for kids to learn a lot. Learning about animals helps 
with science, math, language arts, social studies, and art.” The description was 
accompanied by an image of a zoo entrance. 
Next was the between-subjects manipulation: “A lot of kids want to go to Zoo 
Summer Camp for this special learning opportunity. But there are only a few spaces open 
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each year. In past years, only kids whose’ families have [a little OR a lot] of money have 
gone to Zoo Summer Camp. So kids from those families got to learn a lot. Kids whose 
families have [a lot of OR a little] money have not gone. So kids from those families 
didn’t get to learn a lot.”  
Then, the first task: “This year, there are 20 new kids who want to go to Zoo 
Summer Camp. But there are only 10 spaces! Here are 10 of the kids who want to go. 
They are from families with a little money [images]. And here are 10 of the kids who 
want to go. They are from families with a lot of money [images]. The Zoo Summer Camp 
has to decide what to do. Let’s hear what you think!” 
Opportunity Allocation Task. Participants made judgments about how “okay or 
not okay” it would be to divide up opportunities in different ways, determined which 
option they thought was the best overall, and gave their reasoning for their decisions. 
First, on a scale of 1 = Really Not Okay to 6 = Really Okay, participants 
evaluated the following approaches: (1) Equal: “How okay or not okay would it be if, this 
year, the Zoo Summer Camp gave 5 spaces to [low-wealth peers] and 5 spaces to [high-
wealth peers]?”, (2) Impartial: “How […] put all the new kids’ names in a bag and pulled 
out 10 names without looking and gave the 10 spaces to those kids, (3) Low-Wealth 
Only: “How […] gave all 10 spaces to [low-wealth peers]?”, (4) High-Wealth Only: 
“How […] gave all 10 spaces to [high-wealth peers]?” 
Then, participants chose (circled) which of the four options (Equal, Impartial, 
Low-Wealth Only, High-Wealth Only) they thought was the best overall, and gave their 
reasoning for their decision: “The Zoo Summer Camp has to make a choice now. They 
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could… [list of all four options]. Which way do you think is the best? Please explain why 
that way is the best.” 
Allocation Norms Task. Next, participants gave their expectations for what the 
two groups (high-wealth and low-wealth) would prefer the Zoo Summer Camp to do: 
“Here are the 10 kids from families with [a lot of/a little money]. What would these kids 
want the Zoo Summer Camp to do? [list of all four options]” As in the Opportunity 
Allocation Task, the four options were Equal, Impartial, Low-Wealth Only, High-Wealth 
Only. For both the high- and low-wealth groups, participants indicated which option each 
group would prefer, and gave their reasoning for their decision: “Please explain why they 
would want the Zoo Summer Camp to do that”. 
Reasoning coding. Participants’ open-ended reasoning in the Opportunity 
Allocation Task and the Allocation Norms Task was coded for analyses into one of nine 
conceptual categories expected based on previous research on distributive justice or 
perceptions of economic inequality and confirmed by pilot testing for this study. 
Responses that did not fit into one of the conceptual categories were coded as “Other”. 
Table 3 (in the Tables section) provides the coding scheme, including conceptual 
categories, definitions, examples of participants’ reasoning, and a notation as to whether 
the category was observed in children’s reasoning for the Opportunity Allocation Task, 
the Allocation Norms Task, or both.  
The coding of open-ended reasoning responses was conducted by two coders 
blind to the hypotheses of the study. Interrater reliability was determined using a subset 




Inequality Perceptions Task. Finally, participants completed a short measure of 
their perceptions of the relations between economic status and access to learning 
opportunities other than those viewed in the experimental paradigm. 
First, participants were reminded of the two wealth groups: “You just heard about 
a city where some families have a lot of money and some families have a little money. 
The kids whose families have a lot of money […]. And the kids whose families have a 
little money […].” Then, for both groups: “How often do these kids get extra learning 
opportunities, other than Zoo Summer Camp?”, on a 5-point Likert-type scale from 1 = 
Never to 5 = All The Time. 
Participant personal interest in the opportunity. At the end of the survey 
participants were asked one question about how much they would personally want to 




Chapter 4: Results 
This section is comprised of three sub-sections. The first sub-section, Children’s 
Perceptions of Opportunity Inequality, provides an initial analysis confirming that 
children were aware of economic inequalities in access to opportunities outside of the 
context of this study (i.e., in broader society). The second sub-section, Children’s 
Judgments about Access to Opportunities, addresses our hypotheses about how 
awareness of inequality relates to children’s judgments and decisions about how access 
to opportunities should be distributed between high- and low-wealth groups. The third 
sub-section, Children’s Expectations for Others’ Access Preferences, addresses our 
hypotheses about changes in children’s expectations for how these groups would prefer 
access to be allocated between middle childhood and early adolescence. 
The analyses reported below include only the N = 267 participants (of 342 total) 
whose parents provided family income information. For some analyses, participants 
were divided into two age groups: the younger group included n = 135 children (MAge = 
10.03 years, SD = 1.02 years, grades 3-5); the older group included n = 132 children 
(MAge = 13.23 years, SD = .93 years, grades 6-8). For these same analyses, participants 
were likewise divided into two income groups based on a median split for the data set: 
the lower-income group (annual family income < $150K) included n = 132 children and 
the higher-income group (annual family income > $150K) included n = 135 children. 
Note that these are groupings were not absolute (low/high) but relative (lower/higher). 
Relative to the rest of the United States, the area where these data were collected has a 
high median annual household income ($99,435) (US Census Bureau QuickFacts, 
2015). There was no relation between income group and age group, χ2(1, N = 267) = 
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1.98, p = .16. Of the younger children 45% (n = 61) were lower-income and 55% (n = 
74) were higher-income; of the older children 54% (n = 71) were lower-income and 
46% (n = 61) were higher-income.  
Children’s Perceptions of Opportunity Inequality 
To determine whether children were aware of economic inequalities in access to 
opportunities other than the summer camp context presented in the study, we conducted a 
2 (Excluded Group: Low-Wealth, High-Wealth) x 2 (Age: Younger, Older) x 2 (Family 
Income: Lower, Higher) x 2 (Perceived Opportunities: High-Wealth Peers, Low-Wealth 
Peers) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. This analysis revealed a 
significant effect for Perceived Opportunities, F(1, 254) = 210.28, p < .001, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .45. 
Children perceived that high-wealth peers had significantly more opportunities (M = 
4.06, SD = 1.07) than low-wealth peers (M = 2.45, SD = 1.09). A significant interaction 
of Perceived Opportunities x Excluded Group also emerged, F(1, 254) = 54.25, p < .001, 
𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .18; we conducted follow-up comparisons using Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons. Children in the low-wealth excluded condition perceived that high-wealth 
peers had more opportunities (M = 4.44, SD = .71) and low-wealth peers had fewer 
opportunities (M = 2.00, SD = .76) than children in the high-wealth excluded condition 
(M = 3.69, SD = 1.22 and M = 2.88, SD = 1.18, respectively), both ps < .001.  
Thus, children who witnessed high-wealth peers being excluded from the summer 
camp perceived a smaller disparity in access to opportunities between these two wealth 
groups than did children who witnessed low-wealth peers being excluded from the same 
opportunity. However, importantly, children in both conditions still perceived that high-
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wealth peers had significantly more opportunities than low-wealth peers (both ps < .001). 
There were no significant effects for Age or Family Income. 
For the next set of analyses (below) testing relations between perceptions of an 
opportunity disparity and judgments about access to opportunities, a difference score was 
created by subtracting participants’ ratings for the low-wealth group from their ratings for 
the high-wealth group. This established a scale ranging from -4 to +4, for which higher 
scores indicated perception of larger opportunity disparity in favor of the high-wealth 
peers. For analyses, participants were split into two groups; those with a difference score 
of 2 or lower comprised the “Low” perceived disparity group (n = 161) while those with 
a difference score of 3 or higher comprised the “High” perceived disparity group (n = 
101). 
Children’s Judgments about Access to Opportunities 
As detailed in Chapter 1 (Rationale), we predicted that children’s decisions about 
how access to an opportunity should be distributed would differ according to their 
awareness of broader economic inequalities in access to opportunities (H1). We also 
predicted that children’s decisions would differ as a function of the camp’s past history of 
exclusion based on wealth group membership (H2), and that this effect would further 
depend on children’s own economic background (H3). Finally, we tested whether 
children would prefer an impartial (“group blind”) approach over a more proactive one 
that guaranteed a given distribution of peers at the camp, but predicted that children 
would perceive that fairness in a context of inequality requires taking into consideration 
what one knows about intergroup relations (H4). 
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Judgments of allocation strategies. To test our hypotheses about children’s 
judgments of the four different means of determining whom to admit to the educational 
summer camp, we conducted a 2 (Perceived Disparity: Low, High) x 2 (Excluded Group: 
Low-Wealth, High-Wealth) x 2 (Age: Younger, Older) x 2 (Family Income: Lower, 
Higher) x 4 (Strategy Judgments: Equal, Impartial, Low-Wealth Only, High-Wealth 
Only) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor, controlling for children’s own 
interest in attending a zoo summer camp. Four effects were significant: a main effect for 
Strategy Judgments and interaction effects for Strategy Judgments x Perceived Disparity, 
Strategy Judgments x Excluded Group, and Strategy Judgments x Excluded Group x 
Family Income. There were no significant effects for Age. All follow-up comparisons on 
interactions (reported below) were conducted with Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons. 
The effect for Strategy Judgments, F(3, 708) = 8.10, p < .001, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .03 revealed 
that, overall, children judged Equal (M = 4.84, SD = 1.09) more positively than any other 
strategy (all ps < .001), did not differ significantly in their judgments of Impartial (M = 
3.92, SD = 1.44) and Low-Wealth Only (M = 4.05, SD = 1.57) (p = 1.00), and judged 
High-Wealth Only (M = 2.51, SD = 1.37) more negatively than any other strategy (all ps 
< .001). Thus, overall, children supported access to the camp for peers of both wealth 
backgrounds. However, supporting H1, the interaction of Strategy Judgments x Perceived 
Disparity, F(3, 708) = 5.27, p = .001, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .02, indicated that children’s judgments 
differed as a function of their perceptions of economic inequality in broader society (see 
Figure 1 in the Figures section).  
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Specifically, children who perceived a high disparity judged Low-Wealth Only 
more positively (p = .003) while children who perceived a low disparity judged High-
Wealth Only more positively (p = .04). Further, children who perceived a high disparity 
judged Low-Wealth Only just as positively as Equal (p = .17), and judged Impartial less 
positively than Equal (p < .001). By contrast, children who perceived a low disparity 
judged Equal the most positively (all ps < .001). All children judged Impartial and Low-
Wealth Only equally positively (all ps > .05) and judged High-Wealth Only most 
negatively (all ps < .001). Thus, children who perceived a large economic gap in access 
to opportunities were more likely to grant access to low-wealth children when they had 
the chance to choose who to admit to a special opportunity. By contrast, children who 
perceived a smaller disparity were more accepting of admitting high-wealth peers only. 
Further, the interactions of Strategy Judgments x Excluded Group, F(3, 708) = 
12.77, p < .001, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .05, and Strategy Judgments x Excluded Group x Family Income, 
F(3, 708) = 2.81, p = .04, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .01, indicated that children also took into consideration 
how access to the camp had been restricted in the past when determining whom to admit 
(supporting H2). However, in line with H3, children interpreted previous exclusion 
through the lens of their own economic background (see Figure 2 in the Figures section). 
Specifically, all children judged Low-Wealth Only more positively when low-
wealth peers had been excluded in the past (all ps < .001). However, higher-income 
children (p = .001), but not lower-income children (p = .78), judged High-Wealth Only 
more positively when high-wealth peers had been excluded in the past, and more 
positively than lower-income children in the same condition (p = .03). Judgments of 
Equal and Impartial did not differ based on condition or family income (all ps > .05). 
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Thus, when low-wealth peers had been excluded, children were especially likely to 
support including low-wealth peers in the future, but only higher-income children were 
more supportive of admitting high-wealth peers when that group had been excluded in 
the past. 
Further, when low-wealth peers had been excluded in the past, all children judged 
Equal and Low-Wealth Only equally positively (all ps = 1.00), and judged High-Wealth 
Only the most negatively (all ps < .001). However, lower-income children (p = .009), but 
not higher-income children (p = .08) judged Low-Wealth Only more positively than 
Impartial. This indicates that lower-income children who heard that low-wealth peers had 
been excluded in the past were especially concerned with ensuring access for these peers 
in the future. 
Further, when high-wealth peers had been excluded in the past, all children 
judged Equal most positively (all ps < .05), and Impartial just as positively as Low-
Wealth Only (all ps > .05) but more positively than High-Wealth Only (all ps < .05). 
However, lower-income children judged Low-Wealth Only more positively than High-
Wealth Only (p = .003) whereas higher-income children judged both strategies equally 
positively (p = .19). This indicates that the effects for higher-income children were more 
subtle. Although higher-income children were more supportive of admitting high-wealth 
peers when this group had been excluded in the past, Equal was the preferred strategy in 
this condition. 
Allocation strategy choice. Overall 56% (n = 148) of participants chose Equal at 
the “best” strategy, 24% (n = 63) chose Low-Wealth Only, 19% (n = 50) chose Impartial, 
and 1% (n = 3) chose High-Wealth Only, χ2(3, N = 264) = 166.03, p < .001.  
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To test our hypotheses about children’s strategy choices, we used a multinomial 
logistic regression to model the effects of Perceived Disparity (Low, High), Excluded 
Group (Low-Wealth, High-Wealth), Age (Younger, Older), and Family Income (Lower, 
Higher) on Strategy Choice (Equal, Impartial, Low-Wealth Only, High-Wealth Only), 
controlling for children’s own interest in attending a zoo summer camp. Addition of the 
predictors resulted in a significant improvement in model fit, LR χ2(15, N = 257) = 33.67, 
Nagelkerke R2 = .14, p = .004. The effect for Excluded Group was significant, χ2(3, N = 
257) = 16.57, p = .001. There were no effects for Perceived Disparity, Age, Family 
Income, or interactions for these predictors. 
Due to some small cell sizes (i.e., no participants chose High-Wealth Only after 
hearing that low-wealth peers had been excluded) we used a Fishers’ exact test and 
follow-up z tests with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons to examine this 
effect; Fisher’s exact = 18.28, p < .001. Children were more likely to choose Low-Wealth 
Only when low-wealth peers had been excluded in the past (.35 versus .13), and more 
likely to choose Equal when high-wealth peers had been excluded (.63 versus .49). Thus, 
providing further support or H2, when low-wealth peers had been excluded children were 
especially likely to support including them in the future, and when high-wealth peers had 
been excluded Equal was the preferred strategy, indicating that children’s decisions about 
who should receive access to the camp opportunity differed as a function of the camp’s 
specific past history of exclusion. The proportion of children choosing Impartial (.22 
versus .16) and High-Wealth Only (.02 versus 0) did not differ significantly by condition. 
Reasoning for allocation strategy choice. Overall, 39% of participants (n = 101) 
reasoned about Ensuring Equal Representation, 15% (n = 40) reasoned about Ensuring 
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Access to Learning, 15% (n = 40) reasoned about Avoiding Biased Decisions, 12% (n = 
32) reasoned about Addressing Economic Inequality, 11% (n = 27) reasoned about 
Rectifying Access Inequality, and 8% (n = 20) reasoned about Avoiding Conflict 
Between Groups. 
To test our hypotheses about children’s reasoning for their strategy choice we 
used a multinomial logistic regression to model the effects of Excluded Group, Perceived 
Disparity, Age, Family Income, and Strategy Choice on children’s Reasoning (six 
conceptual categories). Addition of the predictors resulted in a significant improvement 
in model fit, LR χ2(35, N = 257) = 290.77, Nagelkerke R2 = .70, p < .001. The effects for 
both Strategy Choice, χ2(15, N = 257) = 253.11, p < .001, and Perceived Disparity, χ2(5, 
N = 257) = 11.70, p = .04, were significant. Given the complexity of the model, we tested 
for main effects only. We used Fisher’s exact tests and follow-up z tests with Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons to examine differences in children’s reasoning based 
on Strategy Choice and Perceived Disparity. 
For the effect of Perceived Disparity Fisher’s exact = 17.39, p = .004. Children 
who perceived a high disparity were more likely to reason about Rectifying Access 
Inequality (MHigh = .16 versus MLow = .07) and Ensuring Access to Learning (MHigh = .23 
versus MLow = .11), whereas children who perceived a low disparity were more likely to 
reason about Ensuring Equal Representation (MLow = .45 versus MHigh = .29). Thus, 
providing further support for H1, children who perceived a large economic gap in access 
to opportunities were more likely to reason about correcting past disparities and ensuring 
access to learning opportunities. Reasoning about Addressing Economic Inequality (MHigh 
= .14 versus MLow = .10), Avoiding Biased Decisions (MLow = .17 versus MHigh = .13), and 
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Avoiding Conflict Between Groups (MLow = .10 versus MHigh = .05) did not differ 
significantly as a function of perceived disparity. 
For the effect of Strategy Choice Fisher’s exact = 302.25, p < .001. Children who 
chose Low-Wealth Only were the most likely to reason about Addressing Economic 
Inequality (MLW = .37 versus ME = .05, MI = .02, MHW = 0), children who chose Equal 
were the most likely to reason about Ensuring Equal Representation (ME = .68 versus 
MLW = .02, MHW = 0, MI = 0), children who chose Impartial were the most likely to reason 
about Avoiding Biased Decisions (MI = .75 versus ME = .03, MLW = 0, MHW = 0). Thus, 
children who chose to admit low-wealth peers to the camp were the most likely to reason 
about broader economic inequalities. Further, in line with H4, while children who chose 
Equal reasoned about ensuring the representation of both groups at the camp, children 
who chose Impartial reasoned about avoiding bias in the decision-making process. 
Children who choose Low-Wealth Only and children who chose High-Wealth Only were 
also more likely to reason about Rectifying Access Inequality (MLW = .24, MHW = .67) 
and Ensuring Access to Learning (MLW = .34, MHW = .33) than children who chose Equal 
(Rectifying: ME = .05; Learning ME = .11) or Impartial (Rectifying: MI = .04; Learning 
MI = .04). References to Avoiding Conflict Between Groups did not differ significantly 
by Strategy Choice (MI = .15, ME = .08, MLW = .03, MHW = 0). 
Children’s Expectations for Others’ Decisions 
As detailed in Chapter 1 (Rationale) we predicted that, between middle childhood 
and early adolescence, children would increasingly expect the high- and low-wealth 
groups to prefer the approach that provided them the opportunity to attend the camp (over 
other approaches like equality or impartiality) (H5). However, we predicted that children 
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would perceive different underlying motivations for the high-wealth and low-wealth 
groups’ preferences (H6). Further, we predicted that family income would be related to 
children’s expectations for others’ allocation preferences (H7). In the context of 
predicting others’ behavior, children were expected to express stereotypes about both the 
high- and low-wealth groups (H8). 
To better reflect our hypotheses about this measure, we recoded the dependent 
variable Strategy Choice so that it reflected own-group-benefitting or other-group-
benefitting decisions. That is, choices of “High-Wealth-Only” and “Low-Wealth-Only” 
were recoded so that they reflected the match between the group and their choice. For 
example, if a participant expected the high-wealth group to choose “High-Wealth Only”, 
that response was recoded to “Benefit Ingroup”.  
Expectations for groups’ allocation preferences. To test our hypotheses about 
children’s expectations for how the two groups would prefer that access to the summer 
camp be determined, we first ran two multinomial logistic regression models examining 
the effects of Age, Family Income, and Excluded Group (Low-Wealth, High-Wealth) on 
Strategy Choice Expectations (Benefit Ingroup, Equal, Impartial, Benefit Outgroup), one 
for the high-wealth group and one for the low-wealth group. 
High-wealth group. Overall 55% (n = 145) of participants expected the high-
wealth group to prefer the approach that benefitted their group alone, 26% (n = 69) 
expected a preference for equality, 11% (n = 28) expected a preference for impartiality, 
and 8% (n = 23) expected a preference for admitting the other group, χ2(3, N = 265) = 
144.04, p < .001. The overall model was a significant improvement in fit, χ2(9, N = 261) 
= 29.38, Nagelkerke R2 = .12, p = .001. The effect for Age was significant, χ2(3, N = 261) 
98 
 
= 27.50, p < .001. Specifically (H5), with increasing age, participants were more likely to 
expect the high-wealth group to want to admit their group alone over equality, β = .41, 
χ2(1) = 21.42, p < .001, Exp(B) = 1.50, 95% CI [1.26, 1.78], and over impartiality, β = 
.35, χ2(1) = 8.81, p = .003, Exp(B) = 1.42, 95% CI [1.13, 1.80]. There were no significant 
effects for Family Income or Excluded Group, and no significant interactions. 
Low-wealth group. Overall 56% (n = 146) of participants expected the low-
wealth group to prefer the approach that benefitted their group alone, 32% (n = 84) 
expected a preference for equality, 10% (n = 26) expected a preference for impartiality, 
and 2% (n = 7) expected a preference for admitting the other group, χ2(3, N = 263) = 
179.54, p < .001. The overall model was a significant improvement in fit, χ2(9, N = 259) 
= 33.86, Nagelkerke R2 = .14, p < .001. The effect for Age was significant, χ2(3, N = 261) 
= 28.19, p < .001. Specifically (H5), with increasing age, participants were more likely to 
expect the low-wealth group to want to admit their group alone over equality, β = .41, 
χ2(1) = 23.53, p < .001, Exp(B) = 1.50, 95% CI [1.27, 1.77], and over impartiality, β = 
.31, χ2(1) = 6.56, p = .01, Exp(B) = 1.37, 95% CI [1.08, 1.73]. There were no significant 
effects for Family Income or Excluded Group, and no significant interactions. 
Together, these results indicate that, between middle childhood and early 
adolescence, children increasingly expected both groups to prefer access to the camp for 
themselves, even if that mean no access, or even shared access, for the other group.  
Expectations for own-group benefit. To take advantage of the repeated-measures 
design, we next used a generalized linear mixed model (with a binomial probability 
distribution and a logit link function) to examine children’s expectations for own-group-
benefitting choices (i.e., the Benefit Ingroup strategy) over any of the other strategies. 
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The GLMM, tested how children’s expectations differed as a function the between-
subjects variables Age, Family Income, and Excluded Group (Low-Wealth, High-
Wealth), as well as the within-subjects variable Allocating Group (High-Wealth, Low-
Wealth). Comparison of the AIC and BIC fit indices (both based on the -2 log pseudo 
likelihood) indicated that a model containing the predictors fit the data better than a null 
model. The effects for both Age and Family Income were significant. Specifically, with 
increasing age (H5), participants were more likely to expect own-group-benefitting 
preferences, β = .35, t(261) = 6.57, p < .001, Exp(B) = 1.41, 95% CI [1.27, 1.57]; see 
Figure 3 (in the Figures section). Further, with increasing family income (H7), 
participants were more likely to expect own-group-benefitting preferences, β = .13, t(261) 
= 2.45, p = .02, Exp(B) = 1.14, 95% CI [1.03, 1.27], see Figure 4 (in the Figures section). 
There were no significant effects for Excluded Group or Allocating Group, and no 
significant interactions. 
These results confirmed that, between middle childhood and early adolescence, 
children increasingly expected both groups to prefer access to the camp for themselves at 
the expense of the other group (in line with H5). Further, the higher children’s family 
income, the more they expected the groups to seek access for themselves alone. 
Reasoning about expectations. To test our hypotheses about children’s reasoning 
for their expectations (coded into eight conceptual categories: Rectifying Access 
Inequality, Addressing Economic Inequality, Ensuring Equal Representation, Avoiding 
Biased Decisions, Ensuring Access to Learning, Maintaining Camp Traditions, 
Benefitting Own Group, Group Stereotypes), we used χ2 and correlation analyses.  
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Differences by group economic status. First, we examined differences in 
children’s reasoning for their expectations as a function of Group (High-Wealth or Low-
Wealth) using a McNemar chi square, χ2(27, N = 255) = 49.96, p = .005. Children were 
more likely to say (H6) that the low-wealth group would be concerned with addressing 
economic inequality (MLW = .12, MHW = .05) and ensuring access to learning (MLW = .08, 
MHW = .04), whereas the high-wealth group would be concerned with benefitting their 
own group (MHW = .31, MLW = .26). Children were also more likely to refer to stereotypes 
(MHW = .19, MLW = .10) when describing their expectations for the high-wealth group. 
Thus, while children expected both groups to seek access for themselves, they viewed the 
high-wealth group as also motivated by stereotypic attributes (like greed and selfishness), 
whereas the low-wealth group was also concerned with broader economic inequalities.  
References to rectifying past access inequality (MLW = .15, MHW = .12), ensuring 
equal representation of both groups at the camp (MLW = .18, MHW = .16), avoiding biased 
decision-making (MLW = .08, MHW = .07), and maintaining the camp’s traditions (MHW = 
.06, MLW = .03) did not differ significantly for the high-wealth versus the low-wealth 
group. Table 4 (in the Tables section) provides the individual ns and proportions for each 
comparison. 
Differences by age. Next, we examined differences in children’s reasoning for 
their expectations for the high-wealth and low-wealth groups as a function Age, Family 
Income, and Excluded Group (High-Wealth or Low-Wealth). Age was correlated with 
increasing references to stereotypes (H8) and decreasing references to ensuring equal 
representation for both the high-wealth (stereotypes: r = .21 p < .01; equal: r = -.19 p < 
.01) and low-wealth (stereotypes: r = .21 p < .01; equal: r = -.12 p < .05) groups. Thus, 
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between middle childhood and early adolescence, children were increasingly likely to 
make stereotypic generalizations about both groups. Notably, however, stereotypes about 
low-wealth peers typically pertained to generosity and compassion (e.g., “Growing up in 
a family that’s poor, they tend to think of others”) whereas stereotypes about high-wealth 
peers typically pertained to selfishness and entitlement (e.g., “They think since they’re 
rich they can get what they want, and that they deserve everything”). Age was also 
correlated with increasing references to benefitting one’s own group (r = .12 p < .05) and 
decreasing references to avoiding biased decisions (r = -.13 p < .05) in regards to the 
low-wealth group. 
Differences by income. Family Income was positively associated with references 
to benefitting one’s own group (r = .13 p < .05) and negatively associated with references 
to avoiding biased decisions (r = -.14 p < .05) in regards to the low-wealth group. There 
were no associations with Family Income and reasoning about the high-wealth group. 
Differences by past exclusion. Children were more likely to say that either group 
would be concerned with correcting the past history of access inequality when their group 
had been excluded in the past (low-wealth group when low-wealth peers excluded: r = 
.20 p < .01; high-wealth group when high-wealth peers excluded: r = .22 p < .01), 
highlighting their awareness of a secondary motivation for seeking access for one’s group 
alone (concerns for fairness stemming from past exclusion). Further, when high-wealth 
peers had been included in the past children were more likely to say that the high-wealth 
group would be concerned with maintaining the camp’s traditions (r = .18 p < .01) and 
avoiding biased decisions (r = .11 p < .05), whereas the low-wealth group would be less 
concerned with equality (r = -.11 p < .05). Thus, although references to the conventions 
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of the camp were rare, they were most likely to emerge in children’s expectations for 
high-wealth peers’ responses to a situation in which they were typically advantaged. 
Chapter 5:  Discussion 
Awareness of Economic Inequality Supports Moral Judgments 
Building on the theoretical foundation of the SRD model (Killen, Elenbaas, et al., 
2015), this study provided evidence for how awareness of intergroup relations (i.e., 
awareness of economic inequality) can contribute to moral judgments in childhood. 
Specifically, children who were aware of economic inequalities were more likely to 
choose low-wealth peers when they had the chance to decide whom to admit to an 
educational opportunity. By contrast, children who were less aware of broader inequality 
were more accepting of admitting high-wealth peers to the educational opportunity. 
While these results are surprising given pervasive assumptions about wealth and 
deservedness (Sigelman, 2012; Woods et al., 2005), they do align with recent studies 
indicating that children and adolescents who know more about racial and ethnic 
inequalities are more likely to take action on behalf of marginalized groups (Diemer & 
Rapa, 2016; Elenbaas & Killen, 2016b; Hughes & Bigler, 2011). Above and beyond 
egalitarian principles, children who were aware of economic inequalities were the most 
likely to judge that low-wealth peers should have access to an opportunity that they might 
not otherwise experience. 
Further, children who chose to admit low-wealth peers were the most likely to 
reason about broader economic inequalities (e.g., “The kids with little money don’t have 
the same opportunities as the kids with lots of money”). This indicates that children who 
decided to include low-wealth peers were able to apply their knowledge about typical 
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economic inequalities to a new context. Rather than replicating the usual pattern, they 
opted to change it. 
Thus, many children used their awareness of inequality in broader society when 
making decisions about who should have access to this special opportunity (in line with 
the predictions of the SRD model). Still, children also took into consideration a specific 
past history of exclusion. In this study, participants made decisions about access to an 
educational summer camp that traditionally only accepted children of high-wealth 
backgrounds or children of low-wealth backgrounds (between subjects). Participants 
were more likely to support admitting low-wealth peers when they had direct evidence 
that low-wealth peers had been excluded in the past. This provides a secondary test of the 
predictions of the SRD model: not only were highly aware children more supportive of 
access for low-wealth peers, but children who were given clear information about 
economic exclusion were as well.  
A number of participatory action interventions with older adolescents and young 
adults have proven effective at enhancing participants’ agency to navigate and challenge 
the constraints faced by marginalized groups (see Diemer et al., 2016 for a recent 
review). These findings suggest that similar work may be effective with younger 
children, particularly when the context is familiar and relevant to their everyday lives. 
Participant Economic Status and Differential Judgments 
Importantly, the effect of a past history of exclusion on children’s decisions about 
access to the camp opportunity was also dependent on children’s own economic 
background. Lower-income children who heard that low-wealth peers had been excluded 
were especially concerned with ensuring access for these peers in the future. The effects 
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for higher-income children were more subtle; although they were more supportive of 
admitting high-wealth peers when this group had been excluded in the past, they still 
judged equality the most positively in this context.  
These findings cannot be attributed to income-related differences in perceptions 
of economic inequalities; all children were aware of such disparities. Instead, the most 
straightforward explanation is that children interpreted the camp’s traditions through the 
lens of their own economic background, exhibiting more concern for righting a pattern of 
exclusion that harmed peers who were more similar to them, as has been shown in related 
work with other types of social groups (Abrams et al., 2015; Sierksma et al., 2015; 
Weller & Lagattuta, 2014). These findings are surprising, however, given that 
participants themselves were not especially wealthy or poor (relative to their regional 
community). 
Given the differences in the amount of control and personal choice that higher- 
and lower-income adults experience in their lives (Kraus et al., 2012), and related 
associations with feelings of entitlement (Piff, 2014), future research should pay close 
attention to emerging socioeconomic differences children’s decisions about access to 
opportunities. This study gave children the choice of whom to include in a special 
opportunity. Not all children will continue to exercise such freedom of choice in 
adulthood when their decisions may have far-reaching consequences for the welfare of 
others. 
Reasoning about Wellbeing 
Wealth disparities in access to educational opportunities are pervasive (Duncan & 
Murnane, 2011), raising important moral questions about justice and rights for children 
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and adults (Wainryb et al., 2008). Notably, children who perceived a high opportunity 
disparity often reasoned about ensuring access to learning (e.g., “They need to get out of 
that poverty cycle and the only way to do that is to learn”). By contrast, children who 
perceived a low disparity focused on ensuring equal representation of both groups at the 
camp.  
Participants ages 8-14 years were selected for this study in part because older 
children demonstrate awareness of the links between wealth status and access to 
opportunities, including educational opportunities (Arsenio et al., 2013; Flanagan et al., 
2014; Goodman et al., 2000). These findings provide new evidence that the larger the 
economic disparity participants perceived the more likely they were to explicitly 
articulate their concerns about ensuring fair access to education.  
Fairness versus Impartiality 
Finally, we tested whether children would prefer an impartial (“group blind”) 
approach to deciding who should receive access to the opportunity over one that 
guaranteed a given distribution of peers at the camp. Children evaluated the impartial 
strategy neutrally to positively. But when choosing the “best” way to determine who 
should receive access to the opportunity, children preferred a more proactive approach to 
ensuring equal access for peers from both wealth backgrounds (e.g., “It’s the fairest 
because it’s 50/50”). These findings provided evidence for the broadest proposition of the 
SRD model: children judged that, in this context, fairness required more than 
impartiality. Rather, it required intentionally taking into consideration what one knows 
about intergroup relations. 
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Related research indicates that children view inequality as acceptable so long as 
the procedure that generated it was impartial (Grocke et al., 2015; Shaw & Olson, 2014). 
Along these same lines, children who chose the impartial approach reasoned about the 
importance of avoiding bias in the decision-making process (e.g., “It’s a random choice, 
no one is choosing because of money or favoritism”). However, most children 
determined that, in a context of intergroup inequality, taking group membership into 
account was important for ensuring fair access to opportunities in the future. 
Expectations for Own-Group Benefit 
 In contrast to children’s own decisions about who should have access to 
opportunities, between middle childhood and early adolescence children increasingly 
expected both groups to prefer access for themselves alone (over other options like 
equality). The difference was dramatic; approximately 20% of 8 year-olds predicted these 
preferences in contrast to approximately 80% of 14 year-olds.  
Due to their greater experience with social groups, older children are able to 
recognize that groups’ perspectives may differ from their own (Abrams et al., 2015; 
Nesdale, 2013). Further, findings from this study fit well with related work indicating that 
older children expect others to share preferentially with ingroup members (DeJesus et al., 
2014; Elenbaas & Killen, 2016c). However, children perceived different underlying 
motivations for the high- and low-wealth groups’ preferences about who should receive 
access to the special opportunity.  
Specifically, children were more likely to say that the low-wealth group would be 
concerned with both addressing economic inequality and ensuring access to learning, and 
more likely to say that the high-wealth group would be concerned with benefitting their 
107 
 
own group. Thus, while children expected both groups to seek access for themselves, 
they perceived the low-wealth group as also concerned with addressing broader economic 
inequalities. 
Stereotypes about Economic Groups 
Along these same lines, between middle childhood and early adolescence, 
children were increasingly likely to make stereotypic generalizations about both 
economic groups. However, children’s stereotypes about low-wealth peers typically 
pertained to generosity and compassion (e.g., “Growing up in a family that’s poor, they 
tend to think of others”) whereas their stereotypes about high-wealth peers often 
pertained to selfishness and entitlement (e.g., “They think since they’re rich they can get 
what they want, and that they deserve everything”). Children were also more likely to 
refer to stereotypes when describing their expectations for the high-wealth group (19%) 
than when describing their expectations for the low-wealth group (10%). 
Most research has focused on children’s stereotypes about the wealthy as 
intelligent or hardworking and the poor as lacking these traits (Sigelman, 2012; Woods et 
al., 2005). Yet this study found that, when considering how groups might distribute 
resources rather than how they obtained their resources, very different assumptions 
emerged. That is, children hold different stereotypes about the preferences of high- and 
low-wealth peers in a context of limited access to opportunities. While unique in the 
developmental literature, these stereotypes do bear some similarities with those observed 
in related research with adults.  
For instance, in addition to perceiving wealthy individuals as competent (i.e., 
intelligent), adults perceive the wealthy as less warm (i.e., competitive) (Cuddy et al., 
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2007; Fiske et al., 2002). Many of the stereotypes that children expressed about high-
wealth peers in this study are similar to these assumptions. For example: “They think 
they’re better than everyone else”, “They take things for granted with their big ego”, 
“They have a lot of money and are probably selfish about it”. To our knowledge, this is 
the first study to find such explicitly negative stereotypes about the wealthy in a young 
sample (for instance, see Roussos and Dunham (2016) for an example of how 6 and 10-
year-olds viewed “rich people” as both smart and nice). 
Further, to our knowledge, this is the first study to find such explicitly benevolent 
stereotypes about low-wealth peers (e.g., “Kids with little money are grateful for the 
things they have”, “They’re kind, and want to be with other people like them”). At first 
these generalizations seem complimentary. However, the fact that children hold positive 
stereotypes about low-wealth peers does not mean that they do not also hold negative 
stereotypes about the same group that may emerge under different circumstances. Some 
research suggests that mixed or compensatory narratives about the poor that emphasize 
positive qualities (e.g., “poor but happy” or “poor but honest”) are related to justification 
of status quo inequalities in adults (Kay & Jost, 2003).  
Thus, these findings are complementary to previous work. Children have 
stereotypes about the norms of economic groups in a context of limited access to 
opportunities (e.g., selfish or generous) alongside stereotypes about how people acquired 
their economic status (e.g., hardworking or lazy). Both sets of assumptions are inherently 
detrimental because they are based on group membership alone and not the 
characteristics of individuals. 
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Participant Economic Status and Differential Expectations 
 Further, the higher children’s family income, the more they expected the members 
of both economic groups to seek access to the opportunity for themselves. These 
expectations may have negative implications for peer relations in both higher- and lower-
income children. There are a number of possible reasons for this relation.  
First, as noted above, approximately 1 in 5 children expressed negative 
stereotypes about the high-wealth group depicted in the study (e.g., entitled, greedy). It is 
possible that higher-income children in the sample had heard such statements from their 
peers before, and began to internalize some of these beliefs (e.g., “everyone is just out for 
themselves”). Another possibility is that higher-income participants may have been 
exposed to competitive norms about economic groups held by the higher-income adults 
in their lives. There is some evidence that higher-income adults in economically unequal 
societies are, under some circumstances, less generous (Piff et al., 2010), less egalitarian 
(Bratanova et al., 2016), and more utilitarian (Côté et al., 2013) in resource allocation 
contexts. Higher-income children’s expectations may be similar to those of the adults in 
their lives, who may perceive a state of tension between economic groups. Research 
indicates that those at the top of social hierarchies are more motivated to maintain them 
(Fiske, 2010), and in general, children exposed to competitive norms about intergroup 
relations are less inclusive (McGuire et al., 2015; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011; Rutland, 
Hitti, Mulvey, Abrams, & Killen, 2015).  
There are likely several mechanisms underlying higher-income children’s greater 
perceptions of self-serving preferences in others. The causes and consequences of 
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socioeconomic differences in children’s perceptions of competitive norms around access 
to opportunities should be a fruitful area for future research. 
Future Directions and Conclusions 
While these findings represent an important step towards understanding both 
children’s perceptions of economic inequality and how children apply their knowledge 
when making moral judgments about access to opportunities, many questions remain.  
First, this study focused on children’s moral judgments about access to 
educational opportunities in a context of economic inequality. This is a previously 
unexplored, but highly salient, social context. However, children’s intergroup attitudes 
are effected by the nature of the personal contact that they have with individuals of 
different backgrounds (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). For example, children who have more 
everyday opportunities to interact with peers of a racial or ethnic background other than 
their own have fewer stereotypes about peers of that background (see Cooley et al., 2016 
for a recent review). The participants in this study attended schools with peers from 
lower-middle to upper-middle income backgrounds, and lived in an area of the United 
States with a considerable amount of socioeconomic variability. Future research 
examining children’s awareness of economic inequality, moral judgments about access to 
opportunities, or expectations about norms surrounding access, may find variability as a 
function of children’s economic environment. 
Second, this study extended previous research at the intersection of moral 
development and developmental subjective group dynamics by identifying the allocation 
norms that children and adolescents expect high- and low-wealth groups to adhere to. As 
mentioned above, however, future research should pay close attention to emerging 
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socioeconomic differences in children’s decisions about and perceptions of economic 
inequalities in access to opportunities. There may be several reasons for higher-income 
children’s greater expectations for self-serving preferences in others, potentially 
including exposure to stereotypes from peers and competitive norms from adults. 
Likewise participants in the current study were not especially high- or low-income 
relative to their regional communities. Although we observed variability in the extent to 
which children expected exclusive norms between economic groups as a function of 
family income, it is possible that these perceptions may differ even more for children 
who are farther up or farther down the income spectrum. 
Along these same lines, there are many ways to define economic groups and 
many ways to measure participant economic status. This study defined economic groups 
in terms of relative wealth (i.e., having “a lot of” or “a little” money) and used visual cues 
(i.e., houses, cars) that signal economic status to children (e.g., Shutts et al., 2016). 
Likewise, participant economic status was measured in terms of approximate annual 
family income. This approach was consistent with many other studies in this area of 
research, and appropriate for the aims of the study. However, it is important to note that 
other possibilities exist, and future research may benefit from a multifaceted approach to 
representing economic status. For example, in addition to wealth and/or income, 
information about education (i.e., the educational attainment of the members of the 
economic groups represented or the educational attainment of participants’ parents) may 
be relevant. Further, by 8-10 years of age children are aware of their own families’ 
economic status relative to other families in their neighborhood or school (Goodman et 
al., 2001, 2015; Mistry et al., 2015), thus future research may benefit from asking 
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children directly about their perceptions of their own economic status in addition to 
measuring objective indicators of family income. 
Additionally, this study revealed that children hold a wide array of stereotypes 
about high-wealth and low-wealth peers. Of particular interest are children’s negative 
stereotypes about the wealthy (e.g., selfish, greedy) and positive stereotypes about the 
poor (e.g., generous, grateful). Few studies have uncovered stereotypes like these in 
development, and while they confirm that children and adolescents are highly attuned to 
others’ economic status, they also reveal a wide range of potentially damaging 
assumptions about others based on their group membership alone (Cuddy et al., 2007; 
Kay & Jost, 2003). 
Finally, beyond the implications of this study for understanding children’s social 
and moral development, the results have broader implications for educators and policy-
makers interested in designing curricula and intervention programs that encourage 
consideration of economic inequality and fairness in development. For instance, recent 
participatory action interventions with older adolescents and young adults have proven 
effective at enhancing participants’ agency to critique and navigate the constraints faced 
by marginalized groups (Diemer et al., 2016). Findings from this study indicate that 
similar work may be effective with younger children, provided that the context is familiar 
and relevant to their everyday lives. 
Overall, this study found that awareness of economic inequality was a positive 
predictor of children’s support for low-wealth peers when deciding whom to admit to a 
special opportunity. However, children exhibited more concern for righting a pattern of 
exclusion that harmed peers who were more economically similar to them. Further, in 
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contrast to their own decisions, between middle childhood and early adolescence children 
increasingly expected others to seek access to opportunities for themselves, and the 
higher their family income the more self-serving tendencies children expected. Finally, 
children held both positive and negative stereotypes about economic groups, and were 










Condition Assignment, by Grade and Family Income 
Grade Family Income Low-Wealth Peers Excluded High-Wealth Peers Excluded Grade Total 
3rd  
< $30K 0 1 
67 
$30K-60K 3 2 
$60-90K 4 1 
$90K-120K 3 7 
$120K-150K 2 3 
$150K-180K 4 4 
> $180K 11 10 
unknown 7 5 
Condition Total 34 33  
4th  
< $30K 2 0 
52 
$30K-60K 1 1 
$60-90K 0 4 
$90K-120K 1 1 
$120K-150K 3 3 
$150K-180K 4 2 
> $180K 7 10 
unknown 7 6 
Condition Total 25 27  
5th  
< $30K 0 0 
50 
$30K-60K 1 2 
$60-90K 3 0 
$90K-120K 3 4 
$120K-150K 4 2 
$150K-180K 3 1 
> $180K 7 10 
unknown 4 6 
Condition Total 25 25  
6th  
< $30K 0 0 
60 
$30K-60K 2 1 
$60-90K 1 1 
$90K-120K 7 4 
$120K-150K 3 3 
$150K-180K 4 6 
> $180K 6 5 
unknown 9 8 
Condition Total 32 28  
7th  
< $30K 0 0 
55 
$30K-60K 5 5 
$60-90K 2 3 
$90K-120K 1 2 
$120K-150K 3 1 
$150K-180K 4 2 
> $180K 6 7 
unknown 6 8 
Condition Total 27 28  
8th  
< $30K 0 0 
58 
$30K-60K 2 3 
$60-90K 1 2 
$90K-120K 6 5 
$120K-150K 4 4 
$150K-180K 4 3 
> $180K 6 8 
unknown 5 5 









Opportunity Allocation Task: Participants decide how opportunities  
should be allocated 
 Judgment of Low-Wealth Only strategy  Likert-type 1 – 6 
 Judgment of High-Wealth Only strategy  Likert-type 1 – 6 
 Judgment of Equal strategy  Likert-type 1 – 6 
 Judgment of Impartial strategy  Likert-type 1 – 6 
 Choice between all four strategies  Categorical 
 Reasoning for choice  Open ended 
Allocation Norms Task: Participants give expectations for how others  
would prefer to allocate 
 Expected choice of low-wealth group between all four strategies  Categorical 
 Reasoning for expected choice  Open ended 
 Expected choice of high-wealth group between all four strategies  Categorical 
 Reasoning for expected choice  Open ended 
Inequality Perceptions Task: Participants report awareness of relations  
between economic status and opportunities 
























 References to corrective 
action in the form of 
giving more 
opportunities to the 
group that was 
excluded in the past 
 
“Because the 
people with a lot of 










References to economic 
inequality in society 
and the implication for 
access to opportunities 
 “Families with little 
money cannot 
afford many 
summer camps but 
rich ones can have 








 References to ensuring 
that members of both 
groups are equally 
represented 
 
“People from both 









 References to avoiding 
bias in the process by 
not taking group 
membership into 
account 
 “It is random and 
the people have 
exactly the same 
chance of getting in 









References to the 
opportunity as a 
learning experience 
 “Everyone has the 
right to education 












References to avoiding 
disputes over access 
 
“So they don’t have 









 References to 
maintaining the 
conventions, customs, 
and traditions of the 
camp 
 
“It’s been that way 







 References to the desire 
for one’s own group to 
benefit from greater 
access  
 “They would want 
just them and their 







 References to 
stereotypes about 
children of high or low 
economic status 
 “Kids with a lot of 
money are greedy 











Children’s Reasoning for their Expectations Differs by Group (High-Wealth, Low-Wealth) 
  High-Wealth Group 







a 10 2 5 3 0 4 11 3 38 0.15 
b 4 5 5 2 0 3 4 8 31 0.12 
c 6 2 27 2 4 0 3 3 47 0.18 
d 3 2 2 8 0 1 2 3 21 0.08 
e 1 2 0 1 4 2 4 5 19 0.08 
f 2 0 0 1 0 2 2 1 8 0.03 
g 5 0 1 0 0 1 53 5 65 0.26 
h 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 21 26 0.10 
Total HW 31 13 13 41 17 9 15 80   
Proportion 
HW 0.12 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.31 0.19   
Note. a. = Rectifying Access Inequality, b. = Addressing Economic Inequality, c. = Ensuring Equal 
Representation, d. = Avoiding Biased Decisions, e. = Ensuring Access to Learning, f. = Maintaining 










Figure 1. Children’s judgments of four ways of distributing opportunities to high-wealth 
and low-wealth peers differ by their perceptions of economic inequality. Bars represent 








































Figure 2. Children’s judgments of four ways of distributing opportunities to high-wealth 
and low-wealth peers are moderated by condition and family income. Bars represent the 
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Figure 3. Increasing expectations for own-group benefit between childhood and 








































Figure 4. Children’s expectations for groups’ preferences by family income. Bars 
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